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PROJECT
RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
UNDER RULE 60(b)-
A STUDY OF FEDERAL CASE LAW
INTRODUCTION
The entry of a default judgment is one of the most severe sanctions
that a federal court can impose upon a party for failure to comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' Due to a party's failure
to "plead or otherwise defend," the entry of a judgment under rule
552 is based solely on the assumption that the facts asserted in the
1. E.g., Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308,
309 (5th Cir. 1977); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 614 (2d
Cir. 1964); Beacon Gasoline Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 505, 506 (W.D. La.
1977); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 71 F.R.D. 594, 597 (D. Mass. 1976);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Garrett, 3 Bankr. Rep. (West) 557, 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 provides: "(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as pro-
vided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk shall enter his default. (b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as
follows: (1) By the Clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a defendant is for a sum
certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, the clerk upon
request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the amount due shall enter judgment for
that amount and costs against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to
appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person. (2) By the Court. In all
other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court
therefor; but no judgment by default shall be entered against an infant or incompe-
tent person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, committee, con-
servator, or other such representative who has appeared therein. If the party against
whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or, if appearing
by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the ap-
plication for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application. If, in
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary
to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court
may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and
proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by
any statute of the United States. (c) Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown the
court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been en-
tered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). (d) Plaintiffs, Coun-
terclaimants, Cross-Claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party
entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party
who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is
subject to the limitations of Rule 54(c). (e) Judgment Against the United States. No
judgment by default shall be entered against the United States or an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court."
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opposing party's well-pleaded complaint are true.3 Rule 60(b), '
however, provides the means by which a defaulting party can move
to set aside a default judgment.
Consideration of a rule 60(b) motion involves a balancing of two
competing and often conflicting goals of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: the concern for judicial economy and orderly court pro-
ceedings and the concern for achieving justice through a trial on the
merits.5 The strong judicial preference for deciding cases on their
merits rather than on procedural grounds militates in favor of setting
aside default judgments and encourages liberal construction of the
requirements for granting the motion.6 This is counterbalanced,
however, by the judiciary's need to promote the prompt and efficient
handling of litigation and to preserve the finality of judgments.-
3. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885); Nishimatsu Constr. Co.
v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63-64, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Clifton v.
Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1927).
4. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides that '[o]n motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect
the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court." The main focus of this Project is on the treatment of motions to set
aside default judgments. Our survey, however, also included an analysis of cases
involving motions to set aside defaults under rule 55(c) and motions for entry of
default judgments under rule 55(b). See note 2 supra. Courts address the same con-
siderations in dealing with these motions. E.g., Spica v. Garczynski, 78 F.R.D. 134,
135 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
944, 950 (N.D. Ind. 1975); Chapman v. Henry A. Dreer, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 218, 219
(E.D. Pa. 1953). See note 21 infra. Because courts treat these motions similarly,
references to set aside motions or to motions to set aside default judgments encom-
pass both rule 55(c) and rule 60(b) motions. When it is necessary to distinguish those
cases that involve the setting aside of a default or the entry of a default judgment
from cases that involve the setting aside of a default judgment, the parenthetical
"(default)" is used.
5. See notes 40-44 infra and accompanying text.
6. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
7. See note 41 infra and accompanying text.
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This Project will analyze how federal trial court judges have re-
sponded to and resolved the tension in the Federal Rules. By review-
ing reported federal court decisions involving the setting aside of de-
fault judgments,8 it will illustrate the conflicting treatment of issues
arising in this area. An attempt will be made to provide the practi-
tioner with a framework for operating within the rules governing the
setting aside of default judgments. Part I will detail the mechanics of
the relevant rules and the discretion that these rules grant to trial
courts. Part II will analyze the relevant case law to determine how
courts have interpreted the grounds for relief from default judgments
provided in the rules. Part III will discuss how the courts have util-
ized judicially established requirements that a movant present a
meritorious defense to the action and show lack of substantial prej-
udice to the non-defaulting party. Finally, to provide for a more
equitable resolution of the tension in the rules, guidelines for decid-
ing motions to set aside default judgments are proposed.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RULES 55 AND 60
A. The Mechanics of Rules 55 and 60
Rules 55 and 60 provide the procedures for entering and setting
aside defaults and default judgments.' The entry of a default judg-
ment must be preceded by the entry of a default. 0 Rule 55(a) pro-
vides that the clerk shall enter the default of any "party against
whom ... affirmative relief is sought [and who] has failed to plead or
otherwise defend as provided by these rules."" Typically, the failure
8. This survey of federal case law uncovered approximately 250 decisions involv-
ing the setting aside of defaults and default judgments. These cases were categorized
in an attempt to detail splits of opinion on certain issues and to establish trends
revealing how these issues are being resolved. To supplement case law analysis,
questionnaires were sent to approximately 400 district court judges. The questions
were intended to elicit the judges' opinions concerning certain issues involved in
considering motions to set aside defaults and default judgments. Statistical analysis of
the results was not viable because only 10% of the judges responded. Nevertheless,
when appropriate, those responses have been incorporated into the Project. See
notes 21, 100, 171, 192, 231, 250, 283 infra. Copies of these responses are on file
with the Fordham Law Review.
9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55, 60.
10. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2682, at 251 (1973).
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Although this procedure will normally be handled by
the clerk, rule 55(a) does not limit the court's power to enter a party's default. Fisher
v. Taylor, 1 F.R.D. 448, 448 (E.D. Tenn. 1940); United States v. Jackson, 25 F.
Supp. 79, 79-80 (D. Or. 1938); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.03[1] (2d ed.
1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2682. Although the court may
enter a party's default, application to the court instead of the clerk is not advisable,
In both Fisher and Jackson, the courts stated that the procedure should be handled
by the clerk. 1 F.R.D. at 448; 25 F. Supp. at 79. Moreover, the Jackson court
warned that it would not entertain such applications in the future. 25 F. Supp. at 80.
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"to plead or otherwise defend" results from a defendant's failure to
answer the plaintiff's complaint within twenty days as mandated by
rule 12(a).12  A party may also fail to plead or otherwise defend by
failing to respond to counterclaims," cross-claims," third-party
claims, 5 or summary judgment motions, 6 failing to attend pretrial
conferences '- and other hearings," failing to obey various court
orders, 9 and failing to respond to certain discovery requests under
rule 37.2° The effect of an entry of default is that the defaulting party
12. E.g., Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 130 F.2d 185,
187 (3d Cir. 1942); Boyer v. Wisconsin, 55 F.R.D. 90, 91 (E.D. Wis. 1972); SEC v.
Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Canup v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 282 (W.D. Pa. 1962). Rule 12(a) provides in part that "'[a]
defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days after the service of the summons and
complaint upon him, except when service is made under Rule 4(e) and a different
time is prescribed in the order of court under the statute of the United States or in
the statute or rule of court of the state." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
13. E.g., Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 125 (4th Cir. 1969); Larson v. General
Motors Corp., 134 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943); Com-
mercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114 F.2d 946, 947 (8th
Cir. 1940). "The provisions of [rule 55] apply whether the party entitled to the judg-
ment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a
cross-claim or counterclaim." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d). Rule 12(a) provides that a party
must respond to these pleadings within 20 days. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
14. E.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114
F.2d 946, 947 (8th Cir. 1940); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United States, 227 F. Supp.
504, 510 (D. Md. 1964); United States v. Foust Distilling Co., 36 F.R.D. 92, 93
(M.D. Pa. 1960).
15. E.g., Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1203-04
(5th Cir. 1975); Fehlhaber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 425 F.2d 715, 716 (3d Cir. 1970).
16. E.g., United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. Kosten-
bauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 450 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (entry made under
Local District Court rule 301.01(e)), aff'd mere. sub nora. Kostenbauder v. Vein-
berger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977).
17. E.g., McGrady v. D'Andrea Elec., Inc., 434 F.2d 1000, 1001 (5th Cir. 1970).
Meeker v. Rizley, 324 F.2d 269, 270 (10th Cir. 1963).
18. E.g., Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir.) (fail-
ure to appear at pre-trial hearing), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Creene v.
Pyatt, 78 F.R.D. 362, 362-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (failure to appear at pre-trial hearing
on opposing party's motion to dismiss).
19. E.g., FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9. 10 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (repeated failure to obey court order to show cause why plaintiff's petition to
enforce a subpoena should not be granted); Dolphin Plumbing Co. v. Financial
Corp. of N. Am., 508 F.2d 1326, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (failure to obey
court order to hire new attorney and have him appear in 14 days). United States v.
One (1) 1950 Burger Yacht, Fla. Registration #FL5163BE, 395 F. Supp. 802, 802
(S.D. Fla. 1975) (failure to obey court order requiring the filing of a statement of all
defenses in forfeiture proceeding); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Sewline Co.,
194 F. Supp. 602, 603-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (failure to comply with court order to
show cause why opposing party's petition to compel arbitration should not be
granted).
20. E.g., Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66, 67-68 (10th Cir. 1967) (failure to answer
interrogatories under rule 37(d)); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, .333 F.2d
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loses his standing to contest the truth of all facts that are "well-
pleaded" in the non-defaulting party's complaint. 2' Despite his de-
257, 266 (9th Cir. 1964) (failure to appear at deposition under rule 37(d)), cert. de-
nied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 71 F.R.D. 594,
596-97 (D. Mass. 1976) (failure to comply with rule 37(b) court order to produce
documents); Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (failure to
obey rule 37(b) court order to appear at deposition coupled with failure to appear at
pre-trial conference); Sonus Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 61 F.R.D. 644,
646 (D. Mass. 1974) (failure to comply with rule 37(b) court order to answer interrog-
atories). Rule 37(b) empowers a court to enter a default judgment when a party has
refused to comply with certain court-ordered discover, requests; the rule also details
which discovery requests can be the basis of a default judgment absent a court order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b). (d).
21. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1885); Nishimatsu Constr.
Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975); Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63-64, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363
(1973); Clifton v. Tomb, 21 F.2d 893, 897 (4th Cir. 1927); 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 55.03[2], at 55-32 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10,
§ 2688, at 280. A default is not an absolute confession of liability. A defaulting party
does not admit to facts that are not well-pleaded or to conclusions of law. Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (defaulting
party successfully challenged the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint that showed
on its face that defaulting party had signed the contract at issue as agent for a dis-
closed principal and was, therefore, not a party to the contract). An entry of default
is also not a final judgment. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.03[2], at 55-32,
55.09, at 55-201 (2d ed. 1976); e.g., Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement
Corp., 130 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1942) (entry of default is a purely formal matter);
Titus v. Smith, 51 F.R.D. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (entry of default is interlocutory);
I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 25 F.2d 180, 183 (D. Mass. 1922) (same).
The distinction between the interlocutory act of entry of default and a default judg-
ment, which represents final judicial action, is implicit in the separate treatment
given the entry and the setting aside of defaults and default judgments in rules 55
and 60(b). Although the task of entering a default judgment is normally left to the
court, the entry of default is usually done by the clerk. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see note
11 supra and accompanying text; notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text. Similarly,
separate standards of review for the setting aside of defaults and default judgments
are set forth in rules 55(c) and 60(b). To set aside an entry of default, a movant need
not meet rule 60(b) criteria, but need only establish "good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(c). Occasionally, courts are more lenient in treating rule 55(c) motions to set aside
defaults than they are in treating rule 60(b) motions to set aside default judgments.
E.g., United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 950 (N.D.
Ind. 1975); Schartner v. Copeland, 59 F.R.D. 653, 656 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd inein., 487
F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Broder v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 54 F.R.D. 583, 583
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297, 299 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Eisler v.
Stritzler, 45 F.R.D. 27, 27-28 (D.P.R. 1968); Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32
F.R.D. 190, 195 (E.D. Va. 1963); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.10[2], at
55-240 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2694, at 319. In
determining whether "good cause" exists, courts consider the sufficiency of the ex-
cuse for the delay in failing to plead or otherwise defend, the promptness in filing
the motion to set aside the default, and the presence of a meritorious defense, ex-
actly the same factors relevant to determining whether a default judgment should be
set aside. E.g., Spica v. Garczynski, 78 F.R.D. 134, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United
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fault, however, a defaulting party is entitled to a hearing on the issue
of unliquidated damages.Y
Under rule 55(b), a default can be reduced to judgment by two
methods.Y3 Rule 55(b)(1) mandates that the clerk enter a judgment
by default "upon request of the plaintiff and upon affidavit of the
amount due" if the defendant has failed to appear2 4 and plaintiff's
claim is for a sum certain.'- If either of these two requirements is
States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 950 (N.D. Ind. 1975);
Chapman v. Henry A. Dreer, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 218, 219 (E.D. Pa. 1953). Although
the courts address the same considerations in dealing with the two types of motions,
they do not always require that all the conditions necessary to set aside a default
judgment be met to set aside an entry of default. For example, the court in SEC v.
Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), noted that "'a court might feel justified in
setting aside a default on a showing that would not move it to set aside a default
judgment."' Id. at 299 n.2 (quoting 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.1012], at 55-
240 (2d ed. 1976) (footnote omitted)). In Kulakowich v. A/S Borgestad, 36 F.R.D.
185 (E.D. Pa. 1964), the court only required that the movant not be guilty of gross
neglect. Id. at 186. Some courts have found that a movant's excuse for his delay need
not be excusable according to rule 60(b) standards for the court to find "good cause"
for granting the motion. E.g., Mitchell v. Eaves, 24 F.R.D. 434 (E.D. Tenn. 1959)
(granting movant's motion although movant's failure to obtain an extension of time in
which to answer was considered inexcusable); Teal v. King Farms Co., 18 F.R.D.
447, 447-48 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ("inadvertence, even if not strictly 'excusable,' may con-
stitute good cause"). A rule 55(c) motion to set aside a default need not be made
within any specific time period. Elias v. Pitucci, 13 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1952). The
Elias court, in granting relief from a default on the basis of mistake when the movant
delayed more than one year in filing his motion, noted that "[rule 55(c), under
which the instant motion was filed, treats a default and a judgment as two separate
and distinct items and in discussing the setting aside of defaults places no time
limitation on the filing of same as does Rule 60(b) in discussing the setting aside of
judgments." Id. at 15; accord, Titus v. Smith, 51 F.R.D. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(no fixed time limitation); Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188, 191 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (limited only by a reasonable time). Most rule 60(b) motions to set aside
default judgments, however, must be brought within one year. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b); see note 64 infra and accompanying text. Of the 22 judges who responded to
the question, "[h]ow do you differentiate the 'good cause' standard of Rule 55(c) for
setting aside entry of default from the Rule 60(b) standards for setting aside a default
judgment?," 13 indicated that they would not differentiate between the standards
under the two rules. Two judges indicated that there is very little difference between
the two rules. One judge cited timing as the only difference. Six judges, however,
did recognize that the rule 55(c) standard of "good cause" should be applied less
strictly than the rule 60(b) standards. See note 8 supra.
22. See Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Hutton v. Fisher,
359 F.2d 913, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1966); Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 962
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718 (1944); Gill v. Stolow, 18 F.R.D. 50S, 509-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957); 6 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 55.03[2], at 55-32 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 10, § 2688, at 284.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). For a discussion of what is sufficient to constitute an
appearance for rule 55(b) purposes, see pt. II(C) infra.
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). The rule 55(b)(1) requirement that the plaintiff's
claim be "for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain"
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not met, the plaintiff may apply to the court for a default judgment
under rule 55(b)(2).1 This second method of reducing a default to
judgment is to be employed in all cases not covered by rule 55(b)(1)."7
When a "party against whom judgment by default is sought has
appeared in the action," rule 55(b)(2) requires that he "be served
with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days
prior to the hearing on such application." '' Rule 55(b)(2) also grants
courts broad discretionary power to hold hearings on damages, take
testimony, conduct investigations, and accord the parties a trial by
jury.2
The validity of a default judgment is determined under principles
applicable to all final judgments. It is subject to attack at any time
merely directs that plaintiff's claim be for liquidated damages only. See 6 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 55.04, at 55-41 to 55-425 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 10, § 2683, at 25. A defaulting party is entitled to a hearing on unliq-
uidated damages, thus barring the clerk from reducing these damages to judgment.
See note 22 supra and accompanying text. Rule 55(b)(1) also bars the clerk from
entering judgment against an infant or incompetent person. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1);
e.g., Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 915 (3d Cir. 1966) (infant); Zaro v. Strauss, 167
F.2d 218, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1948) (incompetent). Although not set out in rule 55(b)(1),
there are two other limitations on the clerk's power to enter a default judgment. The
clerk is barred from entering a default judgment against "the United States or an
officer or agency thereof." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice
55.04, at 55-43, 55.12, at 55-321 (2d ed 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 10, § 2683, at 260, § 2702, at 358. The clerk is also barred from entering the
default of a party in the military service. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 520 (West 1981); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.04,
at 55-43, $ 55.13, at 55-356 & n.19 (2d ed. 1976); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra
note 10, § 2683, at 260, § 2691, at 292.
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
27. Id.
28. Id. For discussion of when a party has appeared for purposes of rule 55 and
the effect of failure to notify an appearing party, see pt. II(C) infra.
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); e.g., Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 37 (D.C. Cir.
1954) (jury trial granted when plaintiff endorsed a demand for jury trial on com-
plaint); Ferraro v. Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1946) (hear-
ing needed to determine attorney's fees but not damages); Peitzman v. City of Illmo,
141 F.2d 956, 962-63 (8th Cir.) (jury trial granted when defendant had defaulted
under rule 37), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 718 (1944); Gill v. Stolow, 18 F.R.D. 508, 510
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (hearing on damages deemed necessary but defendant's request for
jury trial denied because of dilatory tactics), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 669
(2d Cir. 1957); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.07, at 55-95 (2d ed. 1976); 10
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2688, at 279-80. A defaulting party has a
right to a jury trial only "when and as required by any statute of the United States."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Professors Wright and Miller note that § 1874 of title 28 is
the only relevant statute. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2688, at 285.
30. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice $ 55.09, at 55-201 (2d ed. 1976); 7 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 60.25[2], at 297 (2d ed. 1979). A challenge to any judgment,
including one occasioned by default, must be made pursuant to rule 60(b). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). Professor Moore writes that "rule 60(b) applies, without any excep-
tions, to all final judgments entered under the Rules, and there is no sound reason
[Vol. 49
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if the court is found to have lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the
subject matter. 3' The effect of a default judgment, however, varies
slightly from that of a final judgment rendered after a fully litigated
trial on the merits. While the doctrine of res judicata applies to de-
fault judgments,n the majority of courts agree that collateral estoppel
is inapplicable.?
The primary remedy of a party against whom a default judgment is
entered is to bring a rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment in
the trial court.' Rule 60(b) provides six grounds for relief from final
judgments:
for excluding a judgment by default from the applicability of Rule 60(b).- 6A J.
Moore, Federal Practice 60.03[5], at 4032 (2d ed. 1979).
31. E.g., Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 957, 260 (10th Cir. 1971)
(default judgment set aside because court lacked in personam jurisdiction due to
insufficient contacts with the forum state); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 413
(8th Cir. 1955) (default judgment set aside because movant had not been served);
Williams v. Capital Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (same); see 7 J.
Moore, Federal Practice 60.25[2], at 309 (2d ed. 1979); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 10, § 2695, at 325-26.
32. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1947) ("judgment of a court having
jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter operates as res judicata, in the
absence of fraud or collusion, even if obtained upon a default" (citation omitted)).
Moyer v. Mathas, 458 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1972) ("judgment is no less res judi-
cata because it was obtained by default, absent any proof of fraud, collusion, or lack
of jurisdiction"); United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
("the rule of res judicata is rendered no less inexorable by the fact that the judgment
may have been taken by default"); see 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice '1 0.409[4], at
1024-25 (2d ed. 1980).
33. Compare Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (default judg-
ment does not make allegations of complaint evidence in action on different claim)
and United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 959-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (default
judgment has no collateral estoppel effect because nothing was actually litigated) with
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683, 695 (1895) (default
judgment binding as to all facts by estoppel). Professor Moore argues that the pre-
dominant and better view is that a default judgment has no collateral estoppel effect.
1B J. Moore, Federal Practice 0.444[2], at 4006 (2d ed. 1980). But cf. I.T.S.
Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 25 F.2d 180, 185 (D. Mass. 1922) (doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to interlocutory act of entry of default); 6
J. Moore, Federal Practice $ 55.03[2], at 55-33 (2d ed. 1976) (same).
34. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.09, at 55-201 (2d ed. 1976); 9 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 203.06, at 3-27 to -28 (2d ed. 1980); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 10, § 2692, at 296. Rule 55(c) provides that "if a judgment by default has
been entered, [the court] may ... set it aside in accordance with Rule 6otb)." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(c). Professor Moore explains that a party against whom a default judg-
ment has been taken "must move in the trial court to set aside the judgment; he
cannot draw the facts in issue by appealing directly from the default judgment, be-
cause on the record they stand confessed." 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice 1 203.06, at
3-27 to -28 (2d ed. 1980). A party may, however, appeal directly from a void judg-
ment or from one not authorized by rule 55. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice $ 55.09, at




(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.3
Although rule 60(b) applies to all final judgments," not all of the
above grounds are relevant in the context of setting aside default
judgments. No default judgment cases were found to have been de-
cided under subdivisions (2) and (5). The cases involving considera-
tion of subdivisions (3) and (4) are beyond the scope of this Project
because they involve considerations not relevant to the bulk of de-
fault judgment cases. Moreover, under these subdivisions, the trial
court judge does not have the broad discretion that he has in dispos-
ing of cases brought under subdivisions (1) and (6), 3r which are the
primary grounds for setting aside default judgments.
35. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
36. See note 30 supra.
37. See pt. I(B) infra. Although some motions have been brought under subdivi-
sion (3), movants have had difficulty in establishing the existence of fraud with the
required "clear and convincing" evidence. E.g., Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410,
414 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. An Undetermined Quantity of an Article of
Drug Labeled as Benylin Cough Syrup, 583 F.2d 942, 948 (7th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Nederlansche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V. v. Jay Emm, Inc., 301 F.2d 114,
115 (2d Cir. 1962); Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332, 336-37 (8th Cir. 1947); Jack-
son v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1940); Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D.
355, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Smeck, 78 F.R.D.
537, 540 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In approximately 10% of the reported cases, the court
lacked jurisdiction, thus rendering the default judgment or entry of default void. In
some cases, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Hale v, McCall, 425
F. Supp. 396, 399 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (default); Carignan v. United States, 48 F.R.D.
323, 326 (D. Mass. 1969) (default). In other cases, the court lacked in personamn
jurisdiction due to invalid service of process. E.g., Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d
410, 413 (8th Cir. 1955); Williams v. Capital Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487, 489-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); Gray v. Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of the Congo to the
U.N., 443 F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978);
Thorne v. Pennsylvania, 77 F.R.D. 396, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Phillips v. Flynn, 61
F.R.D. 574, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (default); Kadet-Kruger & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of
Am., 216 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. I11. 1963) (default); Bruce v. Paxton, 31 F.R.D.
197, 200-01 (E.D. Ark. 1962). Finally, in some cases, the court lacked in personan
jurisdiction due to the defendant's insufficient contacts with the forum state. E.g.,
Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1971); DiCesare-Engler
Prods., Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703. 705-07 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United
States v. Wahl, 406 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Graciette v. Star Guid-
ance, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 424, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug
Co., 261 F. Supp. 648, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In some cases, the courts did not
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Apart from satisfying one or more of the rule 60(b) grounds for
setting aside a default judgment, a movant may have to meet addi-
tional judicially established requirements. Almost all courts require
that the movant present a meritorious defense to the underlying
action.' Moreover, many require that the movant show lack of prej-
udice to the non-defaulting party.39 The weight accorded each of
these requirements, however, varies considerably and depends to a
great extent on how the trial court views the goals of the Federal
Rules.
B. Competing Goals of the Federal Rules
and Discretion of the Courts
The disposition of a motion to set aside either a default or a default
judgment involves a reconciliation of two competing and conflicting
goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."° On the one hand,
the goal of preserving the finality of judgments and of promoting
prompt and efficient litigation in the federal courts militates against
specifically state that the judgment was %oid, but merely implied such a conclusion.
E.g., Ziegler v. United States, 86 F.R.D. 703, 707 & n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (default);
Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 4 F.R.D. 496, 498 (S.D.W.
Va. 1945). Once lack of jurisdiction is established, neither the timeliness of the mo-
tion, e.g., Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 1971); Wil-
liams v. Capital Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Ruddies v.
Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F. Supp. 648, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see 3 W. Barron &
A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1327, at 412-13 (C. Wright ed. 1958),
nor the merits of the movant's defense to the suit is considered. E.g., Hicklin v.
Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 413 (8th Cir. 1955); Carignan v. United States, 48 F.R.D.
323, 325 (D. Mass. 1969) (default).
38. See pt. III(A) infra.
39. See pt. III(B) infra.
40. Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970) ('he preferred
disposition of any case is upon its merits and not by default judgment ....
However, this judicial preference is counterbalanced by considerations of social
goals, justice and expediency, a weighing process which lies largely within the do-
main of the trial judge's discretion." (citation and footnotes omitted)); Spica v. Care-
zynski, 78 F.R.D. 134, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (default) (The resolution of this motion
involves making a choice between the two conflicting policies of prompt and efficient
handling of litigation in the Federal Courts by reasonably strict enforcement of the
F.R.C.P., and the interests of justice which are normally served by a trial on the
merits."); Bell. Tel. Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D. Del.
1976) ("The Court must balance the need for prompt and efficient handling of litiga-
tion in the federal courts, in accordance with the Federal Rules, against the attain-
ment of a just resolution of a particular dispute before the court."); Ledwith v. Stor-
kan, 2 F.R.D. 539, 541 (D. Neb. 1942) (The trial court judge "must recognize at the
same time, both that the objective of legal procedure is the determination of issues
upon their merits instead of upon refinements of procedure, and also that litigants
and their counsel may not properly be allowed with impunity to disregard the pro-
cess of the court."); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.10[4], at 55-251 (2d ed.
1976).
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setting aside default judgments." On the other hand, the notion that
the Federal Rules should be liberally construed so that decisions are
made on the merits of cases rather than on "procedural niceties" mili-
tates in favor of setting aside default judgments."2 Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." " In
the context of default judgments, however, a speedy determination is
not always compatible with a just determination. The trial court to
which the motion for relief is addressed must decide which goal
should be accorded greater weight given the circumstances of the
case. 
"
Because default judgments are not favored in the law, most courts
agree that the rules governing the setting aside of defaults and default
judgments should be liberally construed 46 whenever possible so that
41. One court has cautioned that without procedures for efficient processing of
cases when a party is in default, there will be "a hopeless backlog and glacial disposi-
tion of cases." Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 453 (M.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd mem. sub noa. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
1977). In Canup v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa.
1962) (default) the court noted that "[o]ne of the basic purposes of the Rules of
Federal Procedure is to secure the 'speedy' determination of pending litigation." Id.
at 283. The court went on to state that "[c]alendar control by the Courts and the
setting of fixed dates for the various steps to be taken in the course of litigation are
among the means by which it is sought to eliminate delay. The bar must realize, and
we declare it as emphatically as we can, that these dates fixed by law, rule, or court
order mean something. They are not empty formalities. To neglect and ignore a date
for action in a court proceeding is in reality a thinly-veiled species of disrespect or
contempt for the Court." Id.; accord, H & F Barge Co. v. Garber Bros., 71 F.R.D.
5, 10 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Nelson v.
Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D.S.C. 1966) (default).
42. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951); Cross v. Fong Eu,
430 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (default).
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Compare Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489
(5th Cir. 1962) with Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). In
Davis, the court interpreted rule 1 as requiring liberal construction of the rules relat-
ing to default judgments, with doubts resolved in favor of a trial on the merits. 302
F.2d at 495. In Kennerly, the court, although noting that rule 55(c) is to be liberally
construed in light of rule 1, stated that "it is not the purpose of this Court in so
doing to subvert the plain provisions of the Rule by such liberality and contributing
to its becoming meaningless; it is to be construed . . . 'to secure the just, speedy
[emphasis supplied], and inexpensive determination of every action."' 447 F. Supp.
at 1087 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.)
44. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
45. E.g., FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Comes v.
Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 68-69 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
46. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Greenspun
v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 382 (1st Cir. 1974); Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130
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justice can be achieved by a trial on the merits.- Courts often dis-
play a repugnancy for deciding cases on technical, procedural
grounds, especially when the result involves the severe sanction of a
judgment without consideration of the merits.'9 With this predisposi-
tion against default judgments in mind, most courts urge that all
doubts concerning the setting aside of a default judgment be resolved
in favor of a trial on the merits.49
A few courts, however, have failed to adopt this liberal attitude.a
Instead, they assert that relief under rule 60(b) is "extra-
ordinary... and may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances.""' Although this proposition may be persuasive when
(4th Cir. 1969); Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v.
Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Standard Grate Bar Co. v. Defense
Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 372 (M.D. Pa. 1944); see 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice
55.10[2], at 55-237 (2d ed. 1976); 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 60.22(2], at 247 (2d
ed. 1979).
47. E.g., American & Foreign Ins. Ass'n v. Commercial Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 980,
982 (1st Cir. 1978); Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974);
Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364
F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th
Cir. 1959); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959) (per
curiam); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951);
Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1947); see 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice 55.10[2], at 55-237 (2d ed. 1976).
48. In Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). the court
stated that "it is contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of mere technicalities." Id. at
1088. The court went on to note that "[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
designed to prevent federal civil [practice from] becoming. . . 'a game of skill in
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome . .. (and] . . . to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.' Id. at 1089 (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)); accord, Cross v. Fong Eu, 430 F. Supp. 1036, 1042 n.8
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
49. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Tolson v.
Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d
166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Hiern v. St. Paul-Mercur' Indem. Co., 262
F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1959); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242,
245 (3d Cir. 1951); Bell Tel. Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16, 21
(D. Del. 1976); United States v. Small, 24 F.R.D. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Stan-
dard Grate Bar Co. v. Defense Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 372 (M.D. Pa. 1944); see
6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.10[1], at 55-235 to -236 (2d ed. 1976).
50. E.g., Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir. 1979); Ben Sager
Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977). See also
Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 450 (M.D. Pa. 1976), affd mern.
sub nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433, 434 (D.S.C. 1967).
51. Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th
Cir. 1977) (quoting DiVito v. Fidelity and Deposit Co.. 361 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir.
1966)); accord, Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir. 1979); Kosten-
bauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 451 (M.D. Pa. 1976), affd mein. sub
nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
$3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433. 434 (D.S.C. 19671.
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sive when rule 60(b) is applied in the context of setting aside judg-
ments rendered after consideration of the merits, it is too harsh when
the judgment sought to be set aside has been entered by default. 2
Despite the pervasiveness of the view that the rule is to be liber-
ally construed when applied to default judgments, in approximately
51% of the reported cases dealing with motions to set aside default
judgments, the motions have been denied.F These results show that
set aside motions are not granted pro forma as an indulgence or cour-
tesy to the party in default. 4 Instead, rule 60(b) provides an effec-
tive and flexible means of denying some defaulters access to the
court. I
The decision whether to set aside a default judgment rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court.5 The existence of some dis-
52. E.g., Bell Tel. Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16 (D. Del,
1976). The court found that "[w]hen applied to default judgments, the standards of
Rule 60(b) are generally interpreted with greater liberality, and doubts resolved in
favor of the moving party, in view of the preference for consideration of a case on its
merits." Id. at 21.
53. Motions for relief were denied in 76 of the 149 cases involving motions to set
aside default judgments. (Statistics on file with the Fordham Law Review). In con-
trast, in approximately 41% of the reported cases dealing with motions to set aside
defaults the motions have been denied. Such motions were denied in 28 of the 68
cases surveyed. (Statistics on file with the Fordham Law Review). These results con-
firm the notion that courts are somewhat more lenient in treating motions to set
aside defaults than they are in treating motions to set aside default judgments,
although the same considerations are addressed in disposing of both types of mo-
tions. See note 21 supra.
54. In Comes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970), the court affirmed the
lower court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, finding that "the
trial court ought not reopen a default judgment simply because a request is made by
the defaulting party." Id. at 1366. In Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D. 539 (D. Neb.
1942), the court denied a motion to set aside a default judgment, finding that "(t]he
vacation of a default judgment duly entered without fraud or overreaching, is not an
action which the court should take arbitrarily or as a courtesy or favor to the losing
party." Id. at 544. Emphasizing the importance of judicial economy, the court went
on to contend that "the admonition towards indulgence in the exercise of an allow-
able discretion must not betray the court into a meddling manifestation of assumed
discretion in circumstances which, under the rules, do not bring discretion into op-
eration." Id. at 545.
55. Furthermore, the possibility of a default judgment may act as a deterrent to
potentially slipshod attorneys and defending parties. H.F. Livermore Corp. v.
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per
curiam).
56. All of the Circuits have recognized the propriety of this approach. American
& Foreign Ins. Ass'n v. Commercial Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 980, 982 (1st Cir. 1978);
FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977); Savarese v. Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc., 513 F.2d
140, 146 (9th Cir. 1975); Wokan v. Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1234 (3d Cir.
1973); Comes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Consolidated
Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
1967); Hughes v. Holland, 320 F.2d 781, 782 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hiern v. St.
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cretion is necessary in light of the many unique factual contexts that
occur and the need to balance properly the competing goals of the
Federal Rules. 7 Because trial courts resolve the tension in the rules
in different ways, their notions of the scope of permissible discretion
vary accordingly.
Although this discretion is broad,' it is not absolute and may not
be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.'9 This is illustrated by the
significant number of appellate decisions in which an abuse of discre-
tion has been found. 61 Of the appellate cases found, approximately
44% reversed trial courts' denials of motions for relief.6 1' None of the
appellate decisions, however, overturned as an abuse of discretion
the trial court's granting of a motion for relief from a default judg-
ment. In total, the trial court's discretion has been upheld in approx-
Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 262 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1959). Smith v. Kincaid, 249
F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co.,
233 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1956).
57. The parameters of good cause, excusable neglect, and other rule 60(b)
grounds for relief are not, and perhaps cannot be, so precisely defined as to elimi-
nate the need for the exercise of discretion. Such terms are not defined in the rules.
Instead, the parameters of the grounds for relief were left to be established by case
law. As the court noted in Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190 (E.D.
Va. 1963), "[t]here is no uniform interpretation of what constitutes 'mistake, in-
advertance, surprise, or excusable neglect.' Perhaps the terms are not capable of
more precise definition." Id. at 195.
58. E.g., Provident Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F.2d 839, 842 (9th
Cir. 1963) (abuse of discretion requires a showing that the district court was "'clearly
wrong"), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij,
N.V. v. Jay Emm, Inc., 301 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1962) "[\QWe would be loathe to
substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge."); International Corporate Enter-
prises v. Toshoku Ltd., 71 F.R.D. 215, 217 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (discretion is broad).
59. E.g., Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1947); Security Trust
& Sav. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Ledwith v. Storkan, 2
F.R.D. 539, 541 (D. Neb. 1942).
60. On appeal, the standard of review of dispositions of motions to set aside both
defaults and default judgments is abuse of discretion. All of the Circuits have recog-
nized abuse of discretion as the proper standard. Olson v. Stone, 558 F.2d 1316,
1321 (10th Cir. 1978); FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 (8th Cir.
1977); Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th
Cir. 1977); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 377, 383 (1st Cir. 1974); Wokan v.
Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1234 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Erdoss, 440
F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Consolidated Masonry
& Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967);
Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1959); Hiern v. St. Paul-
Mercury Indem. Co., 262 F.2d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F.2d
243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957); Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
61. Sixty-six appellate decisions involved appeals from trial courts' denials of mo-
tions to set aside default judgments. Trial courts' denials were reversed in 29 of the
66 cases. (Statistics on file with the Fordham Law ReCiew).
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imately 60% of the reported cases.2 Because only denials of rule
60(b) motions have been reversed, it appears that appellate courts
have in fact functioned as a check on trial courts that fail to construe
the rules with sufficient liberality by resolving the tension in the
rules too one-sidedly in favor of judicial economy.63
II. SETrING ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS UNDER RULES 55 AND 60
A. Rule 60(b)(1)
The discussion of setting aside default judgments logically begins
with an analysis of the requirements specifically set forth in the
Federal Rules. Rule 60(b)(1) outlines the grounds under which most
motions to set aside default judgments are made.6 It provides that a
judgment may be set aside upon a showing that it was obtained
through the "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" of
the movant.63 When used to set aside default judgments, this sub-
section has been interpreted by the courts as requiring a party to
justify his delay or that of his attorney in pleading or "otherwise"
defending.6 To qualify under rule 60(b)(1), the motion must be filed
within a "reasonable time" and in no case may a motion be filed
under this subdivision if more than one year has elapsed since entry
of the judgment.6 7
Because a default judgment is entered after a delay in pleading or
otherwise defending, the majority of cases begin with a discussion of
62. Seventy-three appellate decisions involved appeals from trial courts' disposi-
tions of motions to set aside default judgments. The trial courts' discretion was up-
held in 44 of the 73 cases. (Statistics on file with the Fordham Law Review).
63. E.g., Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d. 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1976); Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951).
64. According to our survey, approximately 80% of the reported cases are de-
cided under subdivision (1).
65. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
66. See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Provident
Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F.2d 839, 842 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 950 (1964); United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Trueblood
v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 195-96 (E.D. Va. 1963). See generally 11 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2858.
67. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The court in Usery v. Weiner Bros., 70 F.R.D. 615
(D. Conn. 1976), noted that "the year is not absolute; it is simply the maximum, and
laches or undue delay will bar relief, even though the motion is made within one
year." Id. at 616. The movant has the added burden of showing that his motion was
timely filed. E.g., Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245,
252-53 (4th Cir. 1974) (delay in seeking relief inexcusable); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364
F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (movant "acted promptly to vacate the default judg-
ment").
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whether the movant has shown a satisfactory excuse for this delay.6,
Many courts will not consider any other factors, such as the merits of
the movant's defense, unless this threshold issue is satisfactorily
resolved." Logically, if the delay is inexcusable, it does not meet the
requirements set forth in the rule for setting aside the default judg-
ment, and the court should deny the motion. Because this approach
overemphasizes concern for judicial economy at the expense of a trial
on the merits,"0 however, some courts have held that to dispose of
68. E.g., Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1969); Hutton v.
Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 915 (3d Cir. 1966); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 48S F.
Supp. 858, 859-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (default); Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 78
F.R.D. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction. Inc.,
392 F. Supp. 944, 950-51 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (default); Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294
F. Supp. 1153, 1155-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D.
413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wagg v. Hall, 42 F.R.D. 589, 590-91 (E.D. Pa. 1967). But
see General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic Gardens, Inc.. 85 F.R.D. 66. 69-70
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231, 234 (N.D. Ca.
1975) (default); Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 139, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (default).
69. E.g., Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809
(7th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Dolphin Plumbing Co. v. Financial Corp. of N.
Am., 508 F.2d 1326, 1327 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Standard Newspapers, Inc. v.
King, 375 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84
F.R.D. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); International Corporate Enterprises v. Toshoku
Ltd., 71 F.R.D. 215, 217 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Medunic v. Lederer, 64 F.R.D. 403,
405-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (default), rev'd, 533 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1976); Seanor v.
Bair Transp. Co., 54 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (default); Titus v. Smith, 51
F.R.D. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (default); Hutton v. Fisher, 35 F.R.D. 167, 168-69
(E.D. Pa. 1964), vacated and remanded, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966); Canup v.
Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 284 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (default);
Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872, 873-74 (W.D. Pa. 1961); United
States v. Willenbrock, 152 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Italian Cook Oil Corp. v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 10 F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1950), rev'd sub
nom. Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951). Some
courts acknowledge or assume the presence of a meritorious defense, but state that
the inexcusability of the delay controls. E.g., Central Operating Co. v. Utility Work-
ers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1974); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tun-
nel Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1956); Spica v. Garezynski, 78 F.R.D.
134, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (default); Caputo v. Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 436, 439
(E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D.
433, 436 (D.S.C. 1967); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 9-10 (D.S.C. 1966)
(default); Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D. Pa. 1961);
Morrisey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Ledwvith v. Storkan,
2 F.R.D. 539, 544 (D. Neb. 1942). But see New York State Health Facilities Ass'n v.
Carey, 76 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Carey, the delay was held inexcus-
able, but the court held that granting the set aside motion was justified because the
movant had a meritorious defense and the state taxpayers would suffer from the
default judgment.
70. For example, in Dolphin Plumbing Co. v. Financial Corp. of N. Am., 508
F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), the court acknowledged "the strong policy in
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dispose of the motion properly, the merits of the defense and the
excusability of the delay should be considered in tandem." If the
defense to the suit is particularly meritorious, a court may be more
inclined to excuse the delay. 2
Regardless of the merits of the defense, few courts will tolerate a
willful and egregious disrespect for court procedures.73 Thus, before
a court will grant a set aside motion, the excuses offered must indi-
cate an underlying element of good faith.' 4 Actions undercutting
good faith include undue delay in responding to the complaint".3 or in
favor of trial on the merits," but denied the motion stating that "we are equally
aware of the district court's duty to protect the integrity of the judicial process." Id.
at 1327. In Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7 (D.S.C. 1966) (default), the court
noted that although "the policy of the law favors adjudication on the merits . . .the
process of the court is neither to be disregarded or ignored." Id. at 9 (citation omit-
ted).
71. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1951); Broglie v.
Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977) (default); Mitchell v. Eaves, 24
F.R.D. 434, 435 (E.D. Tenn. 1959) (default).
72. See cases cited note 71 supra.
73. Default judgments entered due to violation of the discovery procedure pur-
suant to rule 37 are particularly illustrative of judicial intolerance of such behavior.
Few motions to set aside such judgments are granted. See Brown v. McCormick, 608
F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 1979) (motion denied); Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E.
Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 1977) (same); Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d
66, 69 (10th Cir. 1967) (motion granted); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333
F.2d 257, 269 (9th Cir. 1964) (motion denied), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965);
A-Plus Answering Sen'., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answering Exch., Inc., 74 F.R.D. 157,
158 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 608, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (default) (same); Seanor v. Bair Transp. Co., 54 F.R.D. 35, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(default) (same); Hendricks v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 32 F.R.D. 169, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1963)
(motion granted subject to satisfaction of conditions); United States v. Fong, 182 F.
Supp. 446, 449-50 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (default) (motion denied), aff'd, 300 F.2d 400
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 938 (1962); Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp, 538,
540 (S.D.NY. 1957) (same); Gill v. Stolow, 18 F.R.D. 508, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(same), rev'd, 240 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957). In reversing the lower court's denial of
the motion, the appellate court in Gill held that the circumstances "demonstrate that
[the movant's] default ... was not properly to be characterized as willful." 240 F.2d
at 672.
74. E.g., Provident Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323 F.2d 839, 842-43 (9th
Cir. 1963) (good faith demonstrated by evidence of movant's intent to defend the
action), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp.
1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (good faith demonstrated because movant was unaware of
the suit but "[p]romptly upon verifying the existence of the action . . .brought this
motion to set aside the default judgment").
75. E.g., Residential Reroofing Union Local 30-B v. Mezicco, 55 F.R.D. 516,
518 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (failure to act for three years held inexcusable); Titus v, Smith,
51 F.R.D. 224, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (default) ("failure to act over a period of approx-
imately one year and ten months ... can only be condemned as gross and inexcus-
able neglect"); Wagg v. Hall, 42 F.R.D. 589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (failure to act for
two and one half years held inexcusable); Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp.
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filing the motion' 6 failure to obey court orders,- or presentation of
evidence that conceals more than it reveals.Th Similarly, courts are
not favorably disposed to grant a motion to set aside a default judg-
ment that the movant allowed to be entered in a deliberate, though
misguided, tactical move.79
1. The Movant's Unawareness of the Suit
The movant's unawareness of the suit until after the entry of the
default judgment 8° is sometimes the basis for the set aside motion. To
justify relief in this situation, the movant must adequately establish
not only that his ignorance was due to innocent or excusably negli-
gent conduct, but also that he filed the set aside motion within a
reasonable time after discovery of the existence of the suit." Failure
872, 874 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (failure to act for two and one half years constituted
"supine and inexcusable neglect").
76. E.g., Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance
Co., 87 F.R.D. 152, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (six and one half month delay in filing
motion held inexcusable); Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (if
movant had filed set aside motion promptly after learning of default judgment, rather
than waiting 21 months, "she could very probably have achieved her aim"); Spica v.
Garczynski, 78 F.R.D. 134, 135-36 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (default) (motion denied because
a three month delay, though "not excessive," was not "'quick action"'). A court %%ill
show little sympathy for a movant who fails to file a set aside motion until after the
opposing party seeks to execute the judgment. E.g., Standard Newspapers, Inc. v.
King, 375 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); H & F Barge Co. v. Garber
Bros., 71 F.R.D. 5, 6 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam).
77. E.g., Dolphin Plumbing Co. v. Financial Corp. of N. Am., 508 F.2d 1326,
1328 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 69 F.R.D. 20, 22 (E.D. Pa.
1975).
78. E.g., Jones v. Jones, 217 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1954).
79. E.g., United States v. An Undetermined Quantity of an Article of Drug
Labeled as Benylin Cough Syrup, 583 F.2d 942, 947 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1222-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
849 (1971); Vega Matta v. Alvarez de Choudens, 440 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D.P.R.
1977) (default), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1978).
80. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Standard
Newspapers, Inc. v. King, 375 F.2d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Rooks v.
American Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 167-68 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Smith v.
Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v. $3,976.62 in Currency,
37 F.R.D. 564, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales Corp. v. Sewline
Co., 194 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (default).
81. Compare Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245,
252-53 (4th Cir. 1974) (movant had acceptable excuse for lapsing into default but
delay in seeking relief held inexcusable) mtth Associated Press v. J.B. Broadcasting,
Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 563, 564 (D. Md. 1972) (movant acted with "reasonable prompt-
ness" in filing set aside motion but offered "no adequate excuse for its failure ... to
prevent the default"). But see Beacon Gasoline Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 505
'W.D. La. 1977) (default). In Beacon, the court stated that the movants had been
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to file promptly has been held to be an alternative independent
ground for denying the motion. 2
A movant often supports his claim of unawareness by attacking the
method of service of the summons and complaint.' Even if the court
upholds the service as valid,14 the method employed may provide a
valid excuse for the movant's ignorance of the suit." For example, in
"extremely dilatory" in responding to the suit, but held that "it would be too harsh
to maintain the defaults in the face of their apparent readiness now." Id. at 506.
82. Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 253 (4th Cir.
1974); see cases cited notes 75, 76 supra.
83. Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Smith v. Kin-
caid, 249 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 414 (8th
Cir. 1955); Jones v. Jones, 217 F.2d 239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1954); Williams v. Capital
Transit Co., 215 F.2d 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling
Co., 189 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951); Jackson v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th
Cir. 1940); Ziegler v. United States, 86 F.R.D. 703, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Allen v.
Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Cray v. Permanent Mission of Peo-
ple's Republic of the Congo to the U.N., 443 F. Supp. 816, 821-22 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
mem., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978); Thorne v. Pennsylvania, 77 F.R.D. 396, 397-98
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga.
1975); H & F Barge Co. v. Garber Bros., 71 F.R.D. 5, 9 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 534
F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Ameday v. United States Trucking Co., 62
F.R.D. 72, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Phillips v. Flynn, 61 F.R.D. 574, 577-78 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Schartner v. Copeland, 59 F.R.D. 653, 656-57 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mere., 487
F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Henderson 66 Sales, Inc. v. Harvison, 58 F.R.D. 408, 412
(N.D. Tex. 1973); Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201, 203-04 (D.C.Z. 1970);
Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Byron v.
Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wagg v. Hall, 42
F.R.D. 589, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. $3,976.62 in Currency, 37 F.R.D.
564, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kadet-Kruger & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 216 F.
Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. Ill. 1963); Bruce v. Paxton, 31 F.R.D. 197, 200-01 (E.D. Ark.
1962); Morrisey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Federal En-
terprises, Inc. v. Frank Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109, 113 (W.D. Mo.
1954); United States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1948); Huntington
Cab Co. v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 4 F.R.D. 496, 499 (S.D.W. Va. 1945);
Bayley & Sons, Inc. v. Morgan, 267 F. 858, 858-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
84. Contra, cases cited note 37 supra.
85. Some courts have found the service to be valid but have nevertheless granted
the set aside motion because the movant was found to lack knowledge of the suit due
to innocent or excusably negligent conduct. E.g., Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d
353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 246
(3d Cir. 1951); Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (default); Ameday v. United States Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 72, 73 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Schartner v. Copeland, 59 F.R.D. 653, 655-57 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 487
F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Henderson 66 Sales, Inc. v. Harvison, 58 F.R.D. 408, 411
(N.D. Tex. 1973); Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201, 204-05 (D.C.Z. 1970);
Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Byron v.
Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v.
$3,976.62 in Currency, 37 F.R.D. 564, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In the following cases,
the service was held to be valid and the motion was denied because the movant was
found to have knowledge of the suit despite allegations to the contrary. Smith v.
Kincaid, 249 F.2d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 1957); Jones v. Jones, 217 F.2d 239, 242 (7th
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Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., service of process was
properly made upon the defendant foreign corporation through the
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A copy of the proc-
ess was forwarded to defendant's registered agent, but was returned
undelivered. s7 In reversing the lower court's denial of the motion,
the court excused the defendant's ignorance of the suit because
"[d]efendant's only negligence was a careless conduct of its business
in failing to ascertain that its broker had moved and in failing to
notify the Secretary of the Commonwealth.""
2. The Movant's Negligence
In other cases, the movant may admit awareness of the suit, but
claim that his negligence in allowing the default judgment to be en-
tered was excusable.-' Defendant corporations and insurance com-
panies, for example, may attempt to rely on in-house or inter-office
confusion to excuse delay in defending the suit. Some courts, in
Cir. 1954); Jackson v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1940); Allen v. Jacob-
son, 82 F.R.D. 355, 356-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979); H & F Barge Co. v. Carber Bros., 71
F.R.D. 5, 9 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Wagg v. Hall, 42 F.R.D. 589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Necchi Sewing Mach. Sales
Corp. v. Sewline Co., 194 F. Supp. 602, 604-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (default); Morrisey
v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Federal Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frank Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109, 110-11 (W.D. Mo. 1954). United
States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1948). To ensure awareness of the
suit, some courts have indicated that, whenever possible, the defendant should be
personally served. E.g., Ameday v. United States Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 72, 73-74
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Henderson 66 Sales, Inc. v. Harvison, 58 F.R.D. 408, 411 (N.D.
Tex. 1973); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). At
the very least, courts require strict compliance with the provisions of substitute sen-
ice statutes. E.g., Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.C.Z. 1970). Kadet-
Kruger & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 216 F. Supp. 249, 250 (N.D. I11. 1963)
(default).
86. 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951).
87. Id. at 243-44.
88. Id. at 246.
89. E.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Navieras de Canarias, S.A., 619 F.2d 152, 153
(1st Cir. 1980) (motion denied); Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190,
192 (E.D. Va. 1963) (motion granted).
90. For cases in which a corporate movant attempted to excuse its conduct in
contributing to the delay, see Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir.
1975) (per curiam) (motion denied), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976). Oreenspun v.
Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 382 (1st Cir. 1974) (same); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S.S.
Hellenic Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (motion granted); Reid v.
Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (motion
denied); Wilcox v. Triple D Corp., 78 F.R.D. 5. 7-8 (E.D. Va. 1978) (default) (mo-
tion granted on condition that movant reimburse plaintiff for costs occasioned by the
delay); International Corporate Enterprises v. Toshoku Ltd.. 71 F.R.D. 215, 217-18
(N.D. Tex. 1976) (same); Usery v. Weiner Bros., 70 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Conn.
1976) (motion denied); Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231. 235 (N.D.
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refusing to excuse such conduct, insist that minimal internal safe-
guards should exist to ensure that legal documents reach the re-
sponsible party in time for him to avoid delaulting.9' In granting the
set aside motion, other courts have considered the diligence of the
movant after discovering the error 2 and the actions of the opposing
party.'
Other excuses for delay in defending are difficult to categorize. The
success of excuses offered by movants, such as illness, °' alternative
commitments,9" or confusion as to court procedures"B or related
cases, 97 will depend to some extent on the court's preference for a
trial on the merits.9" In some cases, the sophistication of the movant
Ga. 1975) (default) (motion granted); Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc., 49 F.R.D.
139, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (default) (motion denied); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41
F.R.D. 7, 9-10 (D.S.C. 1966) (default) (same). For cases in which a defending Insur-
ance company attempted to excuse its conduct in contributing to the delay, see
Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (motion
denied); Greco v. Reynolds, 416 F.2d 965, 965 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (same);
Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 129 (4th Cir. 1969) (motion granted); Spica v. Gar-
czynski, 78 F.R.D. 134, 135 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (default) (motion denied); Medunic v.
Lederer, 65 F.R.D. 403, 405-07 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (default) (same), rev'd, 533 F.2d 891
(3d Cir. 1976); Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 193 (E.D. Va.
1963) (motion granted); Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188, 190-91 (E.D.
Pa. 1962) (default) (same).
91. Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); International Corporate Enterprises v. Toshoku Ltd., 71
F.R.D. 215, 218 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
92. Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1969); Trueblood v. Grayson
Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 197 (E.D. Va. 1963).
93. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S.S. Hellenic Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 138-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(default).
94. Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 167 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam);
Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (default).
95. Morris v. Charnin, 85 F.R.D. 689, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (movant alleged de-
lay due to "extreme work-related pressure;" motion granted); Usery v. Weiner Bros.,
70 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Conn. 1976) (movant alleged delay due to business commit-
ments; motion denied); Bowles v. Branick, 66 F. Supp. 557, 558-59 (W.D. Mo. 1946)
(movant alleged delay due to attendance of sick father; motion denied).
96. Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 69 F.R.D. 20, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Titus v. Smith, 51
F.R.D. 224, 226-27 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (default); Standard Grate Bar Co. v. Defense
Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 371-72 (M.D. Pa. 1944).
97. Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. 96
Cases, More or Less, of Fireworks, 244 F. Supp. 272, 272 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
98. Compare United States v. 96 Cases, More or Less, of Fireworks, 244 F,
Supp. 272, 273 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("to deny Movant the right to a full and fair trial of
the issues. . . would be a rather harsh penalty for an error in judgment") and Stan-
dard Grate Bar Co. v. Defense Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 372 (M.D. Pa. 1944)
("[p]owers vested in the trial courts by Rule 60(b) should be liberally exercised in
order that cases may be disposed of upon their merits") with Allen v. Jacobson, 82
F.R.D. 355, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("the desirability of orderliness and predictability
in the judicial process speaks for caution in the reopening of judgments") and
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has been a crucial factor,9 especially when the movant is appearing
pro se.'1
3. Attorney Negligence
Courts have discussed attorney negligence ' as the cause of the
original entry of the default judgment in a number of the reported
cases involving a motion to set aside a default judgment. In such
cases, a court's consideration of the set aside motion is further com-
plicated because it is the client who will be injured if the attorney's
conduct is held to be inexcusable.102  If the attorney demonstrates
due diligence in his client's affairs and a good faith effort in com-
plying with court procedures, a court may find the negligence excus-
able under rule 60(b)(1). 0 Such a demonstration includes a showing
Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (default) C"schedule(s]
must be established and adhered to if this busy court is to be expected to handle the
growing number of disputes brought before it").
99. Morris v. Charnin, 85 F.R.D. 689, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (motion granted);
United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456, 462 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (same); Fleming
v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391, 392 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (same); Woods v. Severson, 9
F.R.D. 84, 87 (D. Neb. 1948) (same).
100. Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co.,
319 F. Supp. 1308, 1310-11 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales
Co., 49 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.S.C. 1970); Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84, 87 (D. Neb.
1948). Professor Moore has argued that "when a litigant appears pro se ... good
reason may exist for relaxing to some extent the standard of alertness that might be
supposed to apply to a member of the bar." 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 60.27[2],
at 364-65 (2d ed. 1976) (footnotes omitted). Twenty-one of 31 judges who responded
to a question as to whether they would be more lenient in excusing the delay of a
pro se defendant indicated that they would be. Two of those judges qualified their
response by stating that the sophistication or wealth of the defendant would be a
crucial factor. See note 8 supra.
101. For a general discussion of the relation of attorney negligence to rule 60(b),
see Kane, Relief from Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 Hast-
ings L.J. 41, 74-80 (1978).
102. E.g., Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Barber
v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Berger. 86 F.R.D.
713, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe
Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Minneapolis Brewing
Co. v. Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.N.D. 1956).
103. Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (attorney error
called "technical" or "slight"); Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1969)
(delay held by court to be result of "necessity" rather than neglect); Edwin Raphael
Co. v. Maharam Fabrics Corp., 283 F.2d 310, 311 (7th Cir. 1960) C'misunderstand-
ing of counsel" held to be excusable neglect); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic
Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (delay due to attorney's out of state
trip held excusable because attorney had contacted opposing counsel prior to trip);
Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (default) (attor-
ney's mistaken belief that he had filed an answer held excusable); Hamilton v. Edell,
67 F.R.D. 18, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (default) (failure to file a timely answer due to
office confusion held excusable); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 87 (E.D. Va.
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that the attorney was reasonably prompt both in discovering that a
default judgment had been entered and in moving to set it aside.'
The success of excuses such as excessive caseloads, 101 office
confusion, 6 confusion with related cases,1 01 personal problems,"" or
1973) (default) (attorney's mistake as to length of time lie had to file an answer held
excusable); Nunn v. Reina, 21 F.R.D. 573, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (failure to file answer
due to "attorney's honest mistake" held excusable); Elias v. Pitucci, 13 F.R.D. 13, 14
(E. D. Pa. 1952) (default) (attorney's mistake of law held excusable).
104. A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir.
1972); Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (de-
fault); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 70
(E.D. Pa. 1979); Vega Matta v. Alvarez de Choudens, 440 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D.P.R.
1977), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1978) (default); Broglie v. Mackay-Smith,
75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977) (default); Hamilton v. Edell, 67 F.R.D. 18, 21
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (default); Nunn v. Reina, 21 F.R.D. 573, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (de-
fault); Elias v. Pitucci, 13 F.R.D. 13, 14 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (default).
105. Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (motion granted);
Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 859 (S.D.NY. 1980) (default)
(motion granted); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D.
66, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (motion granted); Greene v. Pyatt, 78 F.R.D. 362, 363
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (motion denied); A-Plus Answering Serv., Inc. v. Elmhurst Answer-
ing Exch., Inc., 74 F.R.D. 157, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (motion denied); Vega Matta v.
Alvarez de Choudens, 440 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D.P.R. 1977) (default) (motion de-
nied), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1978); Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW,
71 F.R.D. 449, 451-52 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (attorney also claimed involvement with
political campaign; motion denied); aff'd mem. sub nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinber-
ger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977), Canup v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31
F.R.D. 282, 284 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (default) (motion denied); Ledwith v. Storkan, 2
F.R.D. 539, 541-42 (D. Neb. 1942) (attorney's affidavit stated that he was out of the
jurisdiction on other business and thus unaware that a default judgment had been
entered; motion denied).
106. In Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), the attorney
did not receive the defendant's motion for summary judgment in time to defend
because he had failed to inform the opposing party that he had relocated. The court
held that his error was excusable and it set aside the summary judgment that had
been taken by default. Id. at 940. In Savarese v. Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc.,
513 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1975), confusion between defendant's Arizona and Washington
attorneys was blamed fir the delay as each assumed the other would file an answer.
The court stated that if the excuse were true, the lower court may have been too
harsh in denying the motion. The court noted, however, that "the record suggests
that the real reason that no answer was filed was because of a lack of understanding
of the removal process on the part of [defendant's] attorneys." Id. at 146. The court
refused to set aside the default judgment. Id. at 147. In Standard Newspapers, Inc.
v. King, 375 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam), the court held that "misplacing
papers in the excitement of moving an office" was a "frivolous" excuse, especially
because the move occurred fourteen months after the action was begun. Id. at 116.
The court refused to grant the set aside motion. Id. In Barber v. Turberville, 218
F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the attorney claimed that "through oversight an answer
was not filed 'because the complaint became mixed with another file."' Id. at 35.
The court granted the set aside motion. Id. at 36. In Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines,
Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586 (E. D. Pa. 1978), the attorney claimed that his secretary filed the
summons and complaint "without bringing it to his attention." Id. at 588. The court
granted the set aside motion. Id. In Hamilton v. Edell, 67 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Pa.
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inability to communicate with other necessary parties before entry of
the default judgment ,o will depend to some extent on the court's
view of the good faith efforts of the attorney."' In some cases, the
actions of the non-defaulting party have been a factor in the court's
decision whether to grant the set aside motion.'" Moreover, as in
1975) (default), the attorney claimed that the office was in a "state of transformation"
that resulted in "unsettling the office substantially." Id. at 21 (footnote omitted). The
court granted the set aside motion. Id. In Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Merritt, 143
F. Supp. 146 (D.N.D. 1956), the court held that the confusion resulting from the
assumption by one attorney of the practice of another excused the attorney's neglect
in fling a timely answer. Id. at 148-49.
107. In Schram v. O'Connor, 2 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. Mich. 19411, the court held that
the movant's attorney was not negligent in concluding that the opposing party was
pursuing its remedy in bankruptcy court and thus failing to defend in federal district
court. Id. at 194.
108. E.g., Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 811
(7th Cir. 1977) (attorney allegedly "preoccupied with personal problems", motion de-
nied); United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 713-14 (W.D. Pa. 1980) tattorney's
illness resulted in failure to file timely answer; motion granted). In Canup v. Missis-
sippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (default), the court
commented that "[w]ith... regard to the practical realities of life, the Court... is
ordinarily indulgent when counsel's disability is due to conflicting professional en-
gagements or even to impelling personal reasons (such as vacation or hunting season,
family events of joyful nature such as weddings or christenings, public or philanthro-
pic service, bar association activities, and the like, as well as the more sombre occa-
sions of illness or death)". Id. at 283.
109. Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1969); Consolidated Mason-
ry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 250 (4th Cir.
1967).
110. For example, in Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (de-
fault), the court held that "lack of diligence or ... carelessness on the part of a
party's attorney" was inexcusable. Id. at 684 (footnote omitted). In Canup v. Missis-
sippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (default), the court,
noting that the law firm involved was a persistant offender and that its only excuse
for the delay was inadvertence, stated that "[t]o neglect and ignore a date for action
in a court proceeding is in reality a thinly-veiled species of disrespect or contempt
for the Court". Id. at 283.
111. In Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966), the junior member of a
plaintiff's law firm sought entry of a default despite discussions between a senior
member of the firm and opposing counsel. The court granted the set aside motion
because the default would have been avoided or quickly challenged if not for the
failure of communication within the firm. Id. at 915; accord, United States v. An
Undetermined Quantity of an Article of Drug Labeled as Benylin Cough Syrup, 583
F.2d 942, 948-50 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (court weighed misconduct of both
parties and denied the motion); Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center,
Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) (despite contact with defendant's attorney,
plaintiff's attorney obtained a default judgment without notifying him; motion
granted); Consolidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383
F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967) (court refused to believe the movant's contention that
he had been misled by the opposing party; motion denied).
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other cases, the court may consider the merits of the movant's de-
fense to the suit "' and the potential prejudice to the other party." 3
When the court is not convinced that the attorney's conduct is ex-
cusable, the effect on the client of denying the motion becomes more
critical.' Yet, in Link v. Wabash Railroad,"1 the Supreme Court
expressed little sympathy for the plight of the client."' Writing for
the majority, Justice Harlan stated that
[t]here is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of
petitioner's claim because of his counsel's unexcused conduct im-
poses an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose
this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now
avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely
selected agent."
7
The Court added that a client so injured had an adequate remedy in
a suit for malpractice." 8 It has been further suggested that
"[i]f. . .counsel for defendants can neglect without excuse their
clients' business but no ill effects to the clients will be permitted to
112. A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir.
1972); Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969); Consolidated Masonry &
Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1967);
Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1966); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1979); SEC v. Vogel, 49 F.R.D.
297, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (default); Albert Levine Assocs. v. Kershner, 45 F.RD.
450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (default).
113. Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Barber v.
Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954); General Fire & Rubber Co. v. Olym-
pic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1979); SEC v. Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297,
299 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (default); Albert Levine Assocs. v. Kershner, 45 F.R.D. 450,
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (default).
114. See note 102 supra.
115. 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
116. Id. at 633-34.
117. Id. Mr. Justice Harlan added that "[a]ny other notion would be wholly incon-
sistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent." Id. at 634. Judge Mulligan, in United States
v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1977), noted that the Second Circuit "has rather consistently refused to relieve a
client of the burdens of a final judgment entered against him due to the mistake or
omission of his attorney by reason of the latter's ignorance of the law or of the rules
of the court, or his inability to efficiently manage his caseload." Id. at 739; accord,
Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977)
("[n]either ignorance nor carelessness on the part of a litigant or his attorney provide
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)").
118. 370 U.S. at 634 n.10; accord, Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E, Targosz &
Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977); Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 38 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) (Prettyman, J., dissenting); Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369,
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). One commentator has argued that rule 60(b) should be
amended to shift any costs from the client to the attorney when the attorney's negli-
gence caused the entry of the judgment. Kane, supra note 101, at 77-80.
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result from this negligence, complete chaos in judicial proceedings
will surely result." 119
Other courts have indicated that innovative ,'0 or liberal 123 inter-
pretations of the rule 60(b)(1) requirements would avoid injustice to
the client that could result from a strict application of the Link doc-
trine. In Barber v. Turberville,12 the court focused on the conduct of
the client rather than that of the attorney.12 In explaining its deci-
sion to grant the set aside motion, the court stated that when the
defendant is not personally negligent, "the courts have been reluctant
to attribute to the parties the errors of their legal representatives." "2,
Some courts have avoided determining whether the attorney's con-
duct constitutes "excusable neglect" under subdivision (1) by reliev-
ing the client of the default judgment under the "other reason" clause
of subdivision (6).11 Application of this subdivision, however, is com-
plicated by the Supreme Court's decision in Klapprott v. United
States." In Klapprott, the Court held that rule 60(b)(6) relief can be
granted only in an "extraordinary situation" that cannot be "classified
as mere 'neglect"' under rule 60(b)(1). '
119. Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Prettyman, J., dis-
senting); accord, Canup v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283
(W.D. Pa. 1962) (default); Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146,
149 (D.N.D. 1956).
120. In Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), the court
seemingly adopted a new standard when it stated that the movant "should not be
punished for his attorney's mistake absent a clear record of delay, wrillful contempt or
contumacious conduct." Id. at 940 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In United
States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the court granted the set aside
motion despite the attorney's neglect because it did not reach the level of "culpable
conduct." Id. at 715 (emphasis added); accord, Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc.,
78 F.R.D. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
121. In Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1974), the court argued that
"liberal construction [of rule 60(b)(1)] is usually reserved for instances where error is
due to failure of attorneys or other agents to act on behalf of their clients." Id. at
382.
122. 218 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
123. Id. at 36.
124. Id.; accord, Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1980); A.F.
Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 714 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Caruso v. Drake Motor
Lines, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75
F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977) (default); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 87
(E.D. Va. 1973) (default); A.C. Samford, Inc. v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 72,
76-77 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (default).
125. United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977); New York State
Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Transport Pool
Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308, 1311
(N.D. Ga. 1970); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 76, 83 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1979).
126. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
127. Id. at 613. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation in Ackermann
v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-99 (1950); see note 153 infra.
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Courts have complied with the spirit of the Klapprott decision by
granting relief only in those cases involving gross attorney
negligence."2 In L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews,2'1 the court stated
that "clause (6) is broad enough to permit relief when as in this case
personal problems of counsel cause him grossly to neglect a diligent
client's case and mislead the client." "3 Courts adopting the Steuart
approach require the movant to furnish adequate proof that the attor-
ney's gross negligence actually caused entry of the default
judgment. 3
The relative diligence of the client is a key component in both the
Barber and the Steuart approaches for avoiding potentially unjust ap-
plication of the Link doctrine.132  Other courts, however, have refused
to set aside default judgments that are entered due to attorney negli-
gence with little or no consideration of either the effect on the client
or his responsibility for causing the entry of the default judgment.',
If the attorney committed an innocent mistake of law, however, the
128. In Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 76 (Bankr. D. Or.
1979), the court noted that "the greater the negligence involved, or the more willful
the conduct, the less 'excusable' it is. However, the more inexcusable it is, the
greater the sympathy with the victim." Id. at 83; accord, United States v. Cirami,
563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977); New York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76
F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v,
Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1970). But see Ben
Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1977); Kosten-
bauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mere, sub nor.
Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977). In both Targosz and
Kostenbauder, the agency theory of Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), was
cited to support a denial of the motion despite claims of gross attorney negligence.
560 F.2d at 810; 71 F.R.D. at 452-53.
129. 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964).
130. Id. at 235.
131. Compare United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1976) with
United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1977). In the second disposition of
Cirami, the court reversed itself after the movant presented adequate proof that his
attorney was grossly negligent. See Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz &
Co., 560 F.2d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 1977); Ferraro v. Arthur M. Rosenberg Co., 156
F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1946) (default); Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369,
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). For a thorough discussion of the history of the Cirami case, see
24 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 529 (1978).
132. L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 824 (1964); Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
accord, Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 836-37 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v.
Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977); A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib.
Co., 461 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 76, 83 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979). For cases in which the court refused to believe
that the movant had been diligent, see Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz &
Co., 560 F.2d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 1977); Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369,
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(default).
133. Standard Newspapers, Inc. v. King, 375 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam);
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, N.V. v. Jay Emm, Inc., 301 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1962); Greene v. Pyatt, 78 F.R.D. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Kostenbauder v. Secretary,
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majority of courts have relieved the client from the default
judgment.'-"
B. Rule 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6), which provides that a judgment may be set aside for
"any other reason justifying relief,"' is the subdivision under which
most other set aside motions are decided. Unlike movants filing
under subdivisions (1) through (3), movants filing under rule 60(b)(6)
are not confined to a maximum one year time limit after entry of the
judgment." The only restriction is that they file within a reasonable
time. "
In Klapprott v. United States,"" this subdivision was interpreted by
the Supreme Court as giving courts broad discretionary power "to
HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd inern. sub nora. Kostenbauder v.
Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); Canup v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 31 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1962) (default). For example, when an attorney allows
a default judgment to be entered in a deliberate though miscalculated tactical move,
the courts have denied relief. E.g., United States v. An Undetermined Quantity of
an Article of Drug Labeled as Benylin Cough Syrup, 583 F.2d 942, 947 (7th Cir.
1978) (per curiam); United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1222-23 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Vega Matta v. Alvarez de Choudens, 440 F. Supp. 246.
249 (D.P.R. 1977), aff'd mem., 577 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1978) (default).
134. E.g., Savarese v. Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc., 513 F.2d 140, 146-47 (9th
Cir. 1975); Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1959); Moran v.
Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 87 (E.D. Va. 1973) (default); Albert Levine Assocs. v.
Kershner, 45 F.R.D. 450, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (default); United States v. $3,216.59
in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433, 435 (D.S.C. 1967); A.C. Samford, Inc. v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 72, 76 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (default); Nunn v. Reina, 21
F.R.D. 573, 575 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (default); Elias v. Pitucci, 13 F.R.D. 13, 14 (E.D.
Pa. 1952) (default).
135. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The pertinent part provides that '[t]he motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2). and (3) not more than one
year after the judgment ... was entered or taken."
137. Id. One commentator has noted that "what is a reasonable time must be
determined in light of all attendant circumstances.- 7 J. Moore. Federal Practice
60.27[3], at 384 (2d ed. 1979). In some cases, the motion \was not filed within one
year, but was held to have been filed within a reasonable time. E.g., Menier v.
United States, 405 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d
331 (2d Cir. 1953); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.S.C. 1964); United States v.
Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Ark. 1952). In other cases, the motion %as not
filed within one year and was held not to have been filed within a reasonable time.
E.g., Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Allen v. Jacob-
son, 82 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Caputo
v. Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug
Co., 261 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Willenbrock, 152 F. Supp.
431 (E.D. Pa. 1957). In Fleming v. Mante, 10 F.R.D. 391 (N.D. Ohio 1950), the
court stated that "it is never too late to set aside an unjust judgment." Id. at 392.
138. 335 U.S. 601, modified on other grounds, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
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vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish
justice." 139 The Klapprott Court, however, narrowed the scope of
this discretion somewhat by construing rule 60(b)(6) to provide only
for the setting aside of judgments "for all reasons except the five par-
ticularly specified." 140 Judge Learned Hand, in United States v.
Karahalias, 14 demonstrated the problem with this interpretation.'
He stated that rule 60(b)(6) "if confined to situations not covered by
the first three subsections, would be extremely meagre, even assum-
ing that we could find any scope for it at all." 143 He thought it incon-
ceivable that subdivisions (1) through (3), which contain most, if not
all, the possible equitable grounds for relief, should be limited by the
maximum one year time limit for filing the motion, while the "ves-
tigial equities" contained in subdivision (6) are limited only by a
"reasonable time."114 Thus, he interpreted rule 60(b)(6) "as giving
the court a discretionary dispensing power over the [time] limitation
imposed by the Rule." 45 On rehearing, however, the Karahalias
court retracted this theory due to its incompatibility with the Klap-
prott decision.' Consequently, the problem remains that a movant
under rule 60(b) can escape the one year time limitation only if he
brings his motion for relief under one of the "vestigial equities."
After Klapprott, courts have generally agreed that the movant must
adequately prove 141 the existence of an "extraordinary situation" " to
139. Id. at 615; accord, Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir.
1968); Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Transport Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe
Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Marquette Corp. v.
Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799, 803 (E.D.S.C. 1964); United States v. Williams, 109 F.
Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
140. 335 U.S. at 614-15.
141. 205 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953).




146. Id. at 334. Since Karahalias, the Second Circuit has been notable in adhering
to the Klapprott holding that the grounds for relief under the various subdivisions
are mutually exclusive. United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736, 740 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Erdoss, 440
F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Cliff v. PPX Publishing
Co., 84 F.R.D. 369, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D.
413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Other courts have also held that the various subdivisions
are mutually exclusive. Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d
805, 810 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333, 1336 n.3
(7th Cir. 1972)); Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Woods v.
Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84, 85 (D. Neb. 1948); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr.
Rep. (West) 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979).
147. E.g., Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 358 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Cliff v. PPX
Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2
Bankr. Rep. (West) 76, 84 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979); see note 131 supra.
148. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. at 613; e.g., United States v. Cirami,
535 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
RELIEF FROM DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
obtain relief from a default judgment under subdivision (6). The
rationale for this requirement is that the movant should be required
to show something other than mere neglect because he is afforded
the opportunity to file a motion more than one year after the entry of
the judgment.14 Klapprott provides an example of what constitutes a
sufficiently "extraordinary situation" to justify relief from a default
judgment under subdivision (6).' ' The combination of the petition-
er's alleged illness, lack of funds sufficient to hire a lawyer, incarcera-
tion throughout the period by federal authorities, and the result that
the default judgment stripped him of his naturalized citizenship was
held sufficient to qualify him for relief under subdivision (6) despite a
five year delay in filing the motion.' Although the government
argued that this delay was the result of "excusable neglect" under
rule 60(b)(1) and that the one year time limit applicable to that subdi-
vision barred consideration of the motion, the Court disagreed. It
stated that the factual situation presented by the petitioner could not
"fairly or logically be classified as 'mere neglect' on his part." 152
In few other reported cases has the movant alleged a similar cata-
logue of such exceptional circumstances."" That relief under subdivi-
1977); Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Allen v.
Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW,
71 F.R.D. 449, 452 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mern. sub nor. Kostenbauder v.
Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F.
Supp. 648, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West)
76, 84 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979). Courts granting the set aside motion often quote Klap-
prott for the proposition that subdivision (6) relief should be granted "to accomplish
justice." See cases cited note 137 supra. For discussions illustrating the problems in
applying the "extraordinary situation" standard for rule 60(b)(6) relief, see Kane,
supra note 104, at 50-62; Comment, Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a
Final Judgment for "Any Other Reason Justifying Relief'-Rule 60(b)(6), 33 Mo. L.
Rev. 427, 434-39 (1968); Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61
Yale L.J. 76, 81-86 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Relief from Civil Judgments].
149. "[The maximum time limitation of one year that applies to clause (1), (2) and
(3) would be meaningless, if after the year period had run the movant could be
granted relief under clause (6) for reasons covered by clauses (1), (2) and (3)." 7 J.
Moore, Federal Practice 60.27(l], at 343-44 (2d ed. 1979) (footnote omitted).
150. 335 U.S. at 613-15.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 613.
153. In Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950), the Supreme Court mas
again called upon to define the scope of subdivision (6). In Ackermann, the petition-
ers had been stripped of their certificates of naturalization after a trial on the merits.
In denying relief, the Court distinguished Klapprott, stating that "[t]he comparison
strikingly points up the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and
freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence
and inexcusable negligence." Id. at 202. In Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245
(5th Cir. 1968), the court justified subdivision (6) relief on the grounds that the
movant's hopeless insolvency, the questionable tactics of the opposing party, and the
unusual court delay resulting in prejudice to the movant constituted "far more than
mere allegations of excusable neglect." Id. at 248.
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sion (6) may nonetheless be appropriate is demonstrated by those
cases in which subdivision (6) is used to relieve a client of a judgment
entered against him due to the inexcusable negligence of his
attorney."s It is also evident in cases in which subdivision (6) is used
to relieve a party of a judgment considered voidable because of the
party's failure to receive notice under rule 55(b)(2).'m In addition,
subdivision (6) relief has been granted when an innocent third party
was harmed by the default judgment.'-1
While attempting to honor the principles of the Klapprott decision,
however, courts have found ways to exercise their discretion even
when no showing of such an extraordinary situation has been made.
When the movant has been barred from applying under subdivision
(1) due to the one year time limit, courts have granted relief under
rule 60(b)(6) because the movant's conduct was excusable, and justice
required relieving him from the judgment.' 5' For example, after re-
tracting its interpretation of the scope of subdivision (6), the Karaha-
lias court nevertheless granted the set aside motion."
In practice, the set aside motion is usually filed within one year of
the entry of the judgment."19 Consequently, it is rarely necessary to
determine under what subdivision of rule 60(b) relief should be
154. See notes 125-31 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 200-01 infra and accompanying text.
156. E.g., Diversified Utilities Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco Excavating Contracting
Co., 71 F.R.D. 661, 663 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp.
799, 802-03 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
157. E.g., Menier v. United States, 405 F.2d 245, 2,18 (5th Cir. 1968); Transport
Pool Div. of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F. Supp. 1308,
1312 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799, 803 (E.D.S.C. 1964); United
States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456, 461-62 (W.D. Ark. 1952); Fleming v. Mante,
10 F.R.D. 391, 392 (N.D. Ohio 1950). Courts have also barred the movant from
applying under subdivision (1) because of the one year time limit, but have refused
to grant relief under subdivision (6). Cliff v. PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Allen v. Jacobson, 82 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1979); United States
v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D.
655 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Ruddies v. Auburn Spark Plug Co., 261 F. Supp. 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); Caputo v. Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
United States v. Willenbrock, 152 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
158. United States v. Karahalias, 205 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953). This manipula-
tion of terminology underscores the ability of courts to continue to exercise their
discretion in granting subdivision (6) relief. It has been argued that "the [Supreme]
Court's principle that 60(b)(6) and other clauses of 60(b) are mutually exclusive has
not been adhered to in practice. Court interpretations of the excusable neglect provi-
sions in 60(b)(1) have been so broad that when read together with 60(b)(2) through
(5), apparently few fact situations remain to call 60(b)(6) into play." Relief from Civil
Judgments, supra note 148, at 82-83 (footnote omitted).
159. According to our survey, approximately 90% of the reported cases involving
motions to set aside a default judgment were decided tinder subdivision (1) or subdi-
vision (4).
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granted. As one commentator has noted, "[i]n many situations exact
categorization is very difficult and, in the main, should be avoided
except where the category is obvious or where exact choice is neces-
sary to decision. "160
C. Appearance and Notice
Another method of obtaining relief from a default judgment is pro-
vided by rule 55(b). This rule bars the clerk from entering a default
judgment against a party who has appeared in the action ' and pro-
vides that an appearing party "shall be served with written notice of
the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on
such application." ' If an appearing party has failed to receive this
notice and either the clerk erroneously entered the judgment under
rule 55(b)(1) 16 or the court entered the judgment ex parte under rule
55(b)(2),' 64 the party can attempt to establish such failure as a basis
upon which the default judgment may be set aside. To succeed, he
must first show that he has appeared, for a party who has failed to
appear is not entitled to notice.'" The rationale is that the entry of a
default judgment is proper against a totally non-responsive party 1"0 to
avoid undue delay to the plaintiff in obtaining relief'", and to the
court in disposing of the suit.'" The entry of a default judgment
160. 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 60.27[1], at 346-47 (2d ed. 1979) (footnote
omitted).




165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) delineates when service and filing of pleadings and other
papers, including written notice, are required. The rule specifically states that "[nlo
service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear except that pleadings
asserting new or additional claims for relief against them shall be served upon them
in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4." Id. 5(a); e.g., Baez v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 42Z
U.S. 904 (1976); Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1367 (10th Cir. 1970); Anderson
v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872, 873 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Barber v. Turberville,
218 F.2d 34, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Prettyman, J., dissenting). See also Central
Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 2052 (4th Cir. 1974) (under
rules 5(a) and 77(d) parties who had not appeared not entitled to notice of court
order enlarging the time for answering).
166. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (default judgment normally available only when an
essentially unresponsive party halts the adversary process).
167. Id. (when one party is unresponsive, -'the diligent party must be protected
lest he be faced with interminable delay and continued uncertainty as to his rights").
168. Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366, 369 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977) (default
judgment against non-appearing party upheld when "[t]he adversary process was dis-
rupted because the appellant, in the face of explicit warnings to file an answer, re-
fused to be responsive, as orderly judicial procedures should, and do, require'). In
limiting the notice requirement to parties who have appeared, rule 55(b)(2) serves
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
against a party who has failed to appear, either formally or informally,
does not violate due process because by receiving notice of the suit
through service of the summons and complaint the party is not with-
out knowledge of' the pendency of the suit." 9 In the face of' this
knowledge, total failure to appear is inexcusable, and a claim of lack
of notice affords no basis for relief from the default judgment. '1
1. What Constitutes an Appearance
The threshold issue raised by the notice requirement of rule
55(b)(2) is what constitutes an appearance. Courts have responded to
this issue with varying degrees of liberality. 17 The filing of an
answer or complaint has uniformly been held to constitute an
appearance. In the absence of the filing of a pleading relating to
the goal of judicial economy, for it allows the court to proceed summarily against
totally non-responsive parties and bars such parties from reopening judgments ren-
dered against them on lack of notice grounds. See note 41 supra and accompanying
text.
169. The court noted in Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491
F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1974) that "[diefault judgments entered for failure, after proper
service, to answer within the time allowed do not violate due process." Id. at 251. If
a party has not been validly served with the summons and complaint, however, the
judgment is void as a matter of law, and the issues of appearance and notice need
not be reached. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
170. E.g., Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1977); Baez v.
S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert, denied, 425 U.S.
904 (1976); Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.
1974); Wokan v. Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1973); Port-Wide Con-
tainer Co. v. Interstate Maintenance Corp., 440 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970); Rutland Transit Co. v.
Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1956); Sayers v. Colon, 73
F.R.D. 77 (D.V.I. 1976); Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa.
1961); United States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1948).
171. In response to the question, "Do you consider a letter from the defaulting
party to the plaintiff indicating an intention to defend the suit sufficient to constitute
an appearance or is a formal court appearance necessary," 14 judges wrote that they
would require a formal court appearance. Twelve judges indicated that such a letter
would be sufficient to constitute an appearance. One judge wrote that the filing of a
pleading is necessary. Two indicated that some filing with the court is needed,
although not necessarily a formal filing of an appearance. One judge indicated that
the letter would be sufficient if a pro se defaulter was involved, while another judge
felt the letter would be sufficient unless the party in default was a corporation. Those
judges who did not require a formal filing of an appearance indicated that they would
consider many other types of communication sufficient to constitute an appearance.
Five judges indicated that almost any communication between the parties or be-
tween the defaulting party and the court is sufficient. Some judges indicated that
telephone calls and oral communications would suffice, while others indicated that
some sort of a writing is required. See note 8 supra.
172. 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2686, at 270-72; Annot., 27
A.L.R. Fed. 620 (1976). e.g., Magette v. Daily Post, 535 F.2d 856, 856 (3d Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (answer); Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F-2d 66, 68 (10th Cir. 1967)
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the cause of action, some courts require a formal filing of a notice of
appearance pursuant to rule 79. ' Courts have also found that less
formal acts clearly indicating a movant's intention to defend or seek
affirmative relief are sufficient to constitute an appearance.'"
Contacts with the court that have been found sufficient to consti-
tute an appearance for rule 55(b)(2) purposes include the filing of
stipulations,"n motions, ' 6 and a cost and claim bond.'-- In one case,
the movant's presence at two pre-trial conferences was a factor in-
(same); Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.) (answer sufficient even when
movant's attorney subsequently withdrew his appearance), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 816
(1949); Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218, 219 (5th Cir. 1948) (answer to original com-
plaint sufficient even though movant failed to answer amended complaint); Commer-
cial Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114 F.2d 946, 947 (8th Cir.
1940) (per curiam) (complaint); Sonus Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 61
F.R.D. 644, 646 (D. Mass. 1974) (same).
173. Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a). Rule 79(a) provides in part that "[a]ll papers filed with
the clerk, all process issued and returns made thereon, all appearances, orders, ver-
dicts, and judgments shall be entered chronologically in the civil docket on the folio
assigned to the action and shall be marked with its file number." In none of the
reported cases in this area did a court expressly state that it requires a formal filing
pursuant to this rule, but perhaps this can be inferred from opinions in which less
formal contacts were deemed not to constitute appearances. That some courts do
require formal filings pursuant to this rule is clear from the response to our qtestion-
naire. See note 171 supra.
174. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.05[3], at 55-55 (2d ed. 1976); e.g., Charlton
L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977);
Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977); H.F. Livermore
Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Leopfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(per curiam); United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 459,
461 (E.D. Tex. 1972); Press v. Forest Labs., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 354, 357 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D. Pa. 1961); Ken-
Mar Airpark Inc. v. Toth Aircraft & Accessories Co., 12 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mo.
1952).
175. E.g., United States v. Melichar, 56 F.R.D. 49, 50 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (formal
stipulation extending time in which to answer held to constitute an appearance);
United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 657-58 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (stipulation provid-
ing defendants an extension of time in which to plead or otherwise move to the
complaint assumed, for sake of argument, to constitute an appearance); United States
v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506, 508 (M.D. Pa. 1949) (stipulation submitting to the court's
jurisdiction, admitting to the allegations of some counts of plaintiff's complaint, and
consenting to an injunction held to constitute an appearance). The court in Miller
opined that it could "see no magic in the mere filing of a pmecipe for appearance"
by the defaulting party. Id.
176. Hoffman v. New Jersey Fed'n of Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew
Ass'ns., 106 F.2d 204, 205 (3d Cir. 1939) (filing of motion to dismiss for \want of
jurisdiction held to constitute an appearance). But cf. Sayers v. Colon, 73 F.R.D. 77,
78 (D.V.I. 1976) (motion to compel non-resident plaintiffs to post security for costs
held not to constitute an appearance for it in no \vay indicated an intention to defend
the suit).




fluencing the court to find that an appearance had been made.' One
court " concluded that "any action on the part of [the movant], ex-
cept to object to the jurisdiction over his person which recognizes the
case as in court, will constitute a general appearance. "I" That court,
however, found that a change of address letter sent by the movant to
the clerk did not constitute an appearance because it was not respon-
sive to the complainant's suit and did not indicate the party's intent
to defend.'81
In addition to contacts with the court, various types of contact be-
tween the movant and the opposing party or between their attorneys
have been found sufficient to constitute appearances. The rationale
for allowing these less formal appearances is that the notice require-
ment of rule 55(b)(2) is "intended to protect those parties who,
although delaying in a formal sense by failing to file pleadings within
the twenty-day period, have otherwise indicated to the moving party
a clear purpose to defend the suit." 182 Contacts between the parties
that have been deemed sufficient to constitute appearances have in-
cluded written and oral attempts at settlement negotiations,'" com-
178. Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Contra, United
States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1948) (appearance not found
although attorney who had represented movant in criminal case appeared at pre-trial
conference and "from time to time in the civil matter"),
179. Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
180. Id. at 874.
181. Id.
182. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Locpfe, 432 F.2d 689,
691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); accord, Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 446
(E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 659 (S.D. Ohio 1972)
(quoting Livermore); United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D.
459, 461-62 (E.D. Tex. 1972) (quoting Livermore). One court has held, however, that
the mere fact that the plaintiff knew that the defendant planned to contest the suit
was insufficient to constitute an appearance, absent some contact that is "responsive
to plaintiff's formal Court action." Baez v. S.S. Kresge Co., 518 F.2d 349, 350 (5th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976).
183. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In Livermore, the court found that failure to plead or
file an appearance could not be interpreted as reluctance to defend the suit when the
parties had written letters and had a phone conversation about arranging a meeting
to settle this patent infringement suit. Id. at 692. Letters from the non-moving par-
ty's counsel to his client indicated that the non-moving party was aware that the
movant would contest the suit if the settlement negotiations failed. In one letter,
counsel wrote that "I avoided the subject, because I did not want to stimulate them
into activity." Id. at 690 (emphasis omitted). In another letter counsel wrote that
movant's counsel had remarked to him that "we would have difficulty in getting a
judgment, indicating he is aware of the suit." Id. at 691. On the basis of this evi-
dence, the court held that the movant had appeared and was thereby entitled to
notice. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court's order denying the motion to set
aside the default judgment. Id. at 692. In Port-Wide Container Co. v. Interstate
Maintenance Corp., 440 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), the court summarily
decided that participation in oral and written settlement negotiations over a period of
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munications relating to extensions of time in which to answer,'"
appearances in closely related suits," and letters to the other part),
several months after the filing of the complaint did not constitute an appearance. Id.
at 1196. The court affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a default
judgment that had been entered by the clerk under rule 55(b)(1) notwithstanding
that the movant's counsel never received a letter from the opposing part), in which it
was indicated that a default would be sought if settlement negotiations proved unsuc-
cessful. The court's lack of sympathy for the movant is partially explainable in that
the letter was hand-delivered to a secretary in the movant's office. Unfortunately, the
secretary, who was fired at the end of the same day, never delivered the letter to
her employer. Id.
184. E.g., Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 303
(5th Cir. 1977). In Charlton, no answer was filed due to a misunderstanding as to
which of the two defendants was to obtain counsel. Upon discovering this error, the
movant's attorney both telephoned and wrote to the plaintiff's attorney, indicating
his client's intention to defend and requesting additional time in which to answer.
Plaintiff's attorney said he would consult his client, but instead obtained a default
judgment six days later without giving any notice to the movant. In finding an
appearance and granting the motion to vacate, the court stated that seeking "to reap
tactical advantage from [the movant's] prior neglect by acquiring in stealth a decision
sheltered by the rules which protect final judgments" wvas the type of practice rule
55 was designed to prevent. Id. at 309. In Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir.
1966), the movant's counsel failed to answer or take any steps in the litigation for
nearly three years. Id. at 915. Although deciding that this conduct was grossly negli-
gent, the court granted the set aside motion because the movant failed to receive
rule 55(b)(2) notice. The court found that the agreement by a senior partner in the
plaintiff's law firm to the movant's counsel's request for more time to answer consti-
tuted an appearance. The subsequent obtaining of a default by a junior partner in the
firm who was unaware of the agreement was sufficient to justify, setting aside the
default judgment. Id. In Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233
F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1956), although counsel for the parties repeatedly agreed that the
plaintiff would not seek a default judgment, the court found that no appearance had
been made. Id. at 657-58. Rutland is distinguishable from Charlton and Hutton. In
the latter cases, the intent to defend was clear. In Rutland, however, the movant's
attorney not only admitted to having no defense to the action, but, to obtain one of
the time extensions, had given assurances to the plaintiff that he would interpose no
defense. Id. at 657. A formal court order under rule 6(b) can extend the 20 day time
limit in which to answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). It is advisable to pursue this course of
action rather than to rely on the representations of opposing counsel that they will
not seek judgment by default. Such private agreements are not binding on the court.
Enlargement of time under rule 6(b) is committed to the court's discretion, not the
whim of the parties. Id.; e.g., Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement
Corp., 130 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir. 1942) (court approval is required to make stipula-
tions effective). Instructively, in Rutland, the court entered a default judgment even
though the parties had privately agreed to extend the time for answering. 233 F.2d
at 657.
185. E.g., Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(answer and affirmative defenses filed and depositions taken in connection with
plaintiff's original complaint constituted appearance for purposes of second complaint
that was identical to the first); Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 446 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (institution of suit in state court by movant involving same contract and issues
as federal suit constituted unequivocal notice of intention to defend); Press v. Forest
Labs., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 354, 356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (formal appearances filed in state
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containing an answer. 86  Because such contacts clearly indicate an
intent to defend the suit, courts have held that the complainant must
notify the opposing party of his application fbr a default judgment.'
2. Effect of Failure to Notify a Part), Who Has Appeared
Although rule 55(b)(2) provides that notice of the application for a
default judgment "shall" be served on a party who has appeared,,, it
does not specify the consequences of a party's failure to receive such
notice. The courts' treatment of the effect of failure to give notice has
varied greatly. Specifically, courts are divided on the issue whether
failure to give notice should be necessarily regarded as a due process
violation rendering the judgment void and amenable to being set
aside under rule 60(b)(4)."' 9
action and original federal action that was "really one and the same" as the present
action sufficient). In Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970), as in Press,
an appearance was filed in a related state suit. The Gomes court, however, distin-
guished the cases, finding that, unlike the situation in Press, it was not at all clear to
plaintiff Williams that the movant's attorney in the state suit would represent him in
the federal suit. Id. at 1367-68; accord, United States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp. 714, 715
(E.D. Tenn. 1948) (appearance by attorney in related criminal case held insufficient).
186. A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 42 (7th Cir.
1972) (attorney's letter); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 491,
492-93 (S.D. Tex. 1961) (layman's letter). The court in Dormeyer refused to distin-
guish the case from Dalminter merely because that case had involved a layman's
letter. Id. at 42-43. Contra, Winfield Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087 (10th
Cir. 1970) (affirming trial court, which had held that sending answer, counterclaim,
stipulation for an extension of time, and notice for leave to appear specially to the
plaintiff was not sufficient to constitute an appearance). In Stonecipher, the parties
had also orally agreed on an extension of time in which to answer and had agreed
that the plaintiff would file the papers forwarded by the movant's attorney. Id. at
1089. When the court refused to accept the filings, the plaintiff's attorney wrote to
the movant to inform him of the possibility of a default judgment, but failed to warn
him that the case was set for a report on status in three days. Id. Eight days after
sending the letter, the plaintiff's counsel filed for a default judgment. He did not
inform the movant of this or of the setting of dates for hearing on his application.
The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the finding of the trial court on
this issue, but assumed that an appearance had been made and proceeded to affirm
the lower court's denial. Id. at 1091; see note 214 infra and accompanying text.
187. E.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114
F.2d 946, 947 (8th Cir. 1940) (per curiam); Dalminter, Inc. v. Jessie Edwards, Inc.,
27 F.R.D. 491, 493 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
188. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
189. Id. 60(b)(4). Sonus Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 61 F.R.D. 644 (D.
Mass. 1974), was the only case found in which a court expressly referred to subdivi-
sion (4), the applicable subdivision of the rule. Id. at 647 n.4. The language that
courts have used in finding a default judgment to be void for lack of rule 55(b)(2)
notice has varied in its explicitness. E.g., Magette v. Daily Post, 535 F.2d 856, 857
(3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam) ("judgment must be vacated"); H.F. Livermore Corp. v.
Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
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The view that failure to give the notice required by rule 55(b)(2)
renders a judgment void as a matter of law largely prevailed until the
1970s. 1' The trend of the more recent decisions, however, is that
failure to receive rule 55(b)(2) notice merely renders the judgment
voidable by the court. 9 ' Professor Moore, a proponent of this view,
argues that although failure to give notice is "a serious procedural
irregularity. .. the error should be considered in the light of sur-
(movant entitled to notice; "District Court erred"); Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66, 69
(10th Cir. 1967) ("requires that it be set aside"); Swallow v. United States, 380 F.2d
710, 712 (10th Cir. 1967) ("due process of law requires more"); Bass v. Hoagland,
172 F.2d 205, 210-11 (5th Cir.) (void and denial of due process), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 816 (1949); Zaro v. Strauss, 167 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1948) ('court had no
power"); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114 F.2d
946, 947 (8th Cir. 1940) ("error necessitating reversal"); Hoffman v. New Jersey
Fed'n of Young Men's and Young Women's Hebrew Ass'ns, 106 F.2d 204, 207 (3d
Cir. 1939) ("the default judgment was... improper"); United States v. One 1966
Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 459, 462 (E.D. Tex. 1972) (movant entitled "to
the required three-day notice"); United States v. Melichar, 56 F.R.D. 49, 50 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) ("must be set aside"); Press v. Forest Labs., Inc., 45 F.R.D. 354, 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("must be vacated as a matter of law"); United States v. Edgewater
Dyeing and Finishing Co., 21 F.R.D. 304, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ('motion to vacate
the judgment must be granted"); Ken-Mar Airpark Inc. v. Toth Aircraft & Accesso-
ries Co., 12 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1952) ("failure of due process and the
judgment was a nullity"); United States v. Miller, 9 F.R.D. 506, 509 (M.D. Pa.
1949) ("[c]lerk was without power to enter the judgment"). When this view of the
failure to receive rule 55(b)(2) notice is taken, the critical issue is whether the
movant has appeared. H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Cebruder Loepfe,
432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) ('critical question"); United States
v. One 1966 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 459, 461 (E.D. Tex. 1972) ('the
issue"). If he has appeared, additional factors such as the presence of a meritorious
defense, lack of prejudice, and reasons for the delay need not be considered. In
Wilver v. Fisher, 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967), the court, noting that the lower court
had denied the motion because the movant had failed to show a meritorious defense,
argued that "[t]he question is not whether a meritorious defense existed but whether
the default [judgment] was properly entered." Id. at 69. The court in Commercial
Cas. Ins. Co. v. White Line Transfer & Storage Co., 114 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1940),
rejected the non-moving party's contention that the case should be distinguished
from other rule 55(b)(2) notice cases because the trial court had found that no show-
ing of prejudice to the plaintiff had been made. Id. at 947-48.
190. Prior to 1970, 13 cases dealt with the issue of the effect of the failure to
receive rule 55(b)(2) notice. See note 189 supra; notes 195-99, 201 infra. Only three
cases, however, adopted the "voidable" view. Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel
Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); United States v. Borchers, 163
F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 811 (1947); United States ex rel
Knupfer v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1947).
191. After 1970, 14 cases dealt with the issue of the effect of the failure to receive
rule 55(b)(2) notice. See note 189 supra; notes 195-99, 204 infra. Only four cases not
adopt the "voidable" view. Magette v. Daily Post, 535 F.2d 856, 857 (3d Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Cebruder Loepfe, 432
F.2d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); United States v. One 1966 Chevrolet
Pickup Truck, 56 F.R.D. 459, 462 (E.D. Tex. 1972); United States v. Melichar, 56
F.R.D. 49, 50 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
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rounding circumstances and will, at times, be harmless."l Under
this view, lack of notice is not dispositive of the set aside motion.
Instead, it is considered merely to be one of several factors that a
court should evaluate when determining whether a movant's delay is
excusable according to the standards of rule 60(b).19 3
Professor Moore argues that cases involving lack of rule 55(b)(2)
notice should be decided under rule 60(b)(1) or (6), instead of subdi-
vision (4). 9 Unfortunately, few courts clearly specify under which
subdivision they are deciding the case. The Second,19 3 Seventh, 19
192. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice V 55.05[4], at 55-57 (2d ed. 1976) (footnote
omitted); accord, Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977);
Winfield Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Rutland Tran-
sit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1956); Collex,
Inc. v. Walsh, 84 F.R.D. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v. Martin, 395 F.
Supp. 954, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 658-59
(S.D. Ohio 1972). Fed. R. Civ. P. 61, entitled "Harmless Error," provides that "[n]o
error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect In
any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating,
modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Few courts refer explicitly to
rule 61 in their consideration of the effect of failure to receive rule 55(b)(2) notice.
Logically, however, this rule provides the means by which an otherwise void judg-
ment can be viewed as merely voidable. One court has explicitly employed rule 61
for this purpose. United States v. Borchers, 163 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 332 U.S. 811 (1947). Others implicitly do so by adopting Professor Moore's
language that the failure to receive notice "will, at times, be harmless." 6 J. Moore,
Federal Practice 55.05[4], at 55-57 (2d ed. 1976). In response to the question,
"Professor Moore has suggested that failure to notify the defendant once an appear-
ance has been made is a serious error, but not necessarily sufficient to set aside a
default judgment. Do you agree," 18 judges who responded to our questionnaire
indicated that they agreed, while 13 judges indicated that they disagreed. See note 8
supra.
193. In Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court rejected
the view that failure to receive rule 55(b)(2) notice necessarily renders a judgment
void. The court argued that failure to receive notice "is to be considered in light of
all of the surrounding circumstances and other facts of record in accordance with
criteria which govern a Rule 60(b) decision." Id. at 449. If the judgment is viewed as
not necessarily void under subdivison (4), other statutory grounds for relief must be
considered. A party may be required to show the presence of a meritorious defense
and lack of prejudice to the non-moving party. See notes 194, 213 infra and accom-
panying text.
194. 7 J. Moore, Federal Practice 60.25[2], at 310-11 (2d ed. 1979).
195. United States v. Borchers, 163 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 811 (1947); United States ex rel Knupfer v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.
1947).
196. Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 656 (7th
Cir. 1956); cf. A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43
(7th Cir. 1972) (implicitly adopting "voidable" view).
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Ninth,'9 and Tenth Circuits,'" and some district courts,'" however,
have expressly adopted the "voidable" view and many have explicitly
based their decisions on the grounds of rule 60(b)(1) or (6).Y The
Fifth Circuit's reliance on subdivision (6) reflects an implicit adoption
of the "voidable" view."-° The remaining Circuit courts either still
adhere to the "void" view or are silent on the issue.' :
Courts employing the "voidable" approach have found the lack of
formal notice to be harmless when the movant either received actual
notice 103 or would have received it had he pursued his case with
greater diligence."' The same result has been reached when evi-
dence showed that the movant had previously abandoned his claim, =
indicated that he had no defense to the action, -' or bypassed his legal
197. Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366, 369-70 (9th Cir. 1977).
198. Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413-14 (10th Cir. 1979). Winfield
Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970).
199. Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v.
Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Manos, 56
F.R.D. 655, 658 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
200. A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir.
1972) (motion granted under subdivision (1)); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel
Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 1956) (relief unavailable under either
subdivision (1) or (6)); Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 447-48 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(motion denied under subdivision (6)); United States v. Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 661
(S.D. Ohio 1972) (motion denied under subdivision (6)).
201. Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (motion
granted under subdivision(6)); Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center. Inc.,
556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977) (same).
202. The Third and District of Columbia Circuits apparently still follow the void
view. Magette v. Daily Post, 535 F.2d 856, 857 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curian); H.F.
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Cebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 6S9, 692 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (per curiam). The First, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits are silent on
the issue.
203. E.g., Wilson v. Moore and Assocs., 564 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977) (writ-
ten warning to defendant to secure counsel and to answer complaint provided un-
qualified notice). The Wilson court stated, in dicta, that "[a]lthough written notice is
contemplated, it need not necessarily be in any particular form. "The major consid-
eration is that the party is made aware that a default judgment may be entered
against him."' Id. (quoting 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 10, § 2687). But cf.
Swallow v. United States, 380 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1967) (receipt of actual notice
one day prior to hearing did not remedy deficiency in formal notice).
204. E.g., Port-Wide Container Co. v. Interstate Maintenance Corp., 440 F.2d
1195, 1196 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (written notice hand-delivered to secretary in
movant's office who failed to deliver it to movant).
205. E.g., United States v. Borchers, 163 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 811 (1947); United States ex rel. Knupfer v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 675, 677 (2d
Cir. 1947). Both cases involved denaturalization proceedings against parties who re-
nounced their citizenship. One defendant even withdrew his answer. United States
v. Borchers, 163 F.2d at 349. The court deemed that such conduct rendered the lack
of rule 55(b)(2) notice harmless. Id.




right of appeal.an One result of the trend toward adopting the view
that failure to receive notice merely renders the judgment voidable is
that the focus of the cases has shifted away from determining whether
an appearance was made."n Instead, courts will view the failure to
receive notice in the totality of the circumstances 209 and employ
criteria normally governing rule 60(b) motions.10 One district court
rationalized its adoption of the "voidable" view by noting that it
would be "the ultimate triumph of form over substance " " ' to allow
the movant to invoke equitable principles in the determination of
whether he appeared and then to bar the court from considering the
same principles in determining whether the judgment should be set
aside. 212  That court went so far as to deny the set aside motion even
though it found that the party had appeared and had not received
notice.2 13  Several other courts have reached the same result by
assuming an appearance. 24  Following Professor Moore's view, these
cases treat the lack of notice as a procedural irregularity rather than a
substantive or jurisdictional defect.1
It seems, therefore, that the adoption of the "voidable" view has
increased the likelihood that a motion to set aside a default judgment
will not be granted.216 In light of this trend, parties and their lawyers
207. Winfield Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970).
208. The appearance issue is no longer dispositive. Instead, modem courts focus
on the effect on the movant of his failure to receive notice. For example, if the
movant received actual or constructive notice, bypassed his legal remedy of appeal,
or indicated he had no defense to the action, the effect on the movant can be viewed
as negligible. See note 203 supra and accompanying text.
209. In United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court
contended that "[tihe Court must consider the significance of the lack of notice in
light of all the circumstances." Id. at 960-61; see cases cited note 192 supra.
210. E.g., A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th
Cir. 1972) (motion granted based on a showing of excusable neglect and the presence
of a meritorious defense); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233
F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1956) (motion denied due to failure to show inadvertance or
excusable neglect); Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 4,3, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (mo-
tion denied because of inexcusable neglect, lack of a meritorious defense, and the
existence of prejudice).
211. Collex, Inc. v. Walsh, 74 F.R.D. 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
212. Id. at 448-49.
213. Id. at 451.
214. E.g., Winfield Assocs. v. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Borchers, 163 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 811
(1947); United States ex rel. Knupfer v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1947);
United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v.
Manos, 56 F.R.D. 655, 658 (S.D. Ohio 1972). Even in a case in which no appear-
ance was found, the judge noted that the same result would obtain even if the
movant had appeared. Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 233
F.2d 655, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1956).
215. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
216. Of the 12 cases adopting the "voidable" view, see notes 195-99, 201 supra, in
only three were the set aside motions granted. Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199
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should be wary of relying on the failure to receive formal notice of
the application for a default judgment as the sole ground for relief
from that judgment.
III. JUDICIALLY CREATED REQUIREMENTS FOR
SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS
A. Meritorious Defense Requirement
1. Judicial Treatment of the Meritorious Defense Requirement
The requirement that a movant attempting to set aside a default
judgment show that he has a meritorious defense to the suit is not
mandated by rule 60(b). 17  Indeed, in many of the reported cases
involving a discretionary decision by the court, -9 this factor has not
been considered in the disposition of the motion. Some courts have
not even referred to the concept, 219 leading to speculation either that
they have not imposed a showing of a meritorious defense onto the
requirements contained in the rule, or that the presence of other
factors made it unnecessary to reach the meritorious defense issue.
Other courts have acknowledged the merits of the movant's defense
as a factor to be considered, but have clearly specified that the inex-
cusability of the delay was controlling.2 '
(5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc.,
556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1977); A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461
F.2d 40 (7th Cir. 1972).
217. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
218. Discretion is involved in all set aside motions except when the court is found
to lack jurisdiction. See note 37 supra.
219. E.g., Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805 (7th
Cir. 1977); Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Savarese v. Edrick Transfer & Storage, Inc., 513 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1975); Standard
Newspapers, Inc. v. King, 375 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Allen v. Jacob-
son, 82 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Greene v. Pyatt, 78 F.R.D. 362 (E.D.N.Y.
1978); Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (default); Titus v.
Smith, 51 F.R.D. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (default).
220. E.g., United States v. Cirami, 535 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1976) (court noted
that argument that movant had meritorious defense was "plausible but.., not de-
terminative"), rev'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1977); Central Operating
Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252-53 (4th Cir. 1974) (court noted that
movant probably made "sufficient showing" of meritorious defense but it upheld de-
nial of motion due to delay in filing); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago Tunnel Termi-
nal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1956) (court stated that due to the inexcusability
of delay it was "unnecessary to discuss the issue of a meritorious defense"); Spica v.
Garczynski, 78 F.R.D. 134, 136 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (default) (court acknowledged pre-
sence of meritorious defense but denied motion due to inexcusable delay); Caputo v.
Globe Indem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 436, 439, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (though noting that
parties had stipulated as to presence of meritorious defense and that issue of its
presence was "not without significance," court denied motion due to movant's neg-
ligence); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 41 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.S.C. 1966) (default) (court
acknowledged presence of meritorious defense but denied motion due to inexcusable
19811
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
When it is considered, this judicially created requirement has been
used for different purposes. The presence of a particularly merito-
rious defense has prompted some courts predisposed to a trial on the
merits to be more lenient in their treatment of the movant's delay. 21
For example, in Medunic v. Lederer,' the court held "that a district
court cannot rest its denial of a motion to set aside a default judg-
ment on the defendant's negligent failure to timely plead to a com-
plaint, without determining . . . whether a meritorious defense has
been presented in support of the set aside motion."-
Other courts have used the meritorious defense requirement to
further the interests of judicial economy.2 4 As one court noted,
"[a]bsent a meritorious defense, the reopening of the judgment would
be a futile act, imposing an unnecessary burden on the court."223
delay); Morrisey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956) (court noted
that usually default judgment is vacated when meritorious defense exists but denied
motion due to movant's "fault" in causing delay); United States v. Knox, 79 F. Supp.
714, 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1948) (court refused to consider possible merits of movant's
defense to action as it was "no reason for setting aside a default judgment"); Ledwith
v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D. 539, 542, 545 (D. Neb. 1942) (court assumed that "defendants
might have had a valid defense at least in part to the plaintiff's complaint" but de-
nied motion on grounds of inexcusable delay).
221. In Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1974), the appellate court
reversed the lower court's denial of the motion, stating that, "[t]he meritoriousness
of the defense coupled with the lack of any significant prejudice to plaintiff should
have led the district court to resolve in [the movant's] favor any doubts in connection
with the motion to vacate." Id. at 355. In Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co.,
189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951), the court stated that "[w]hat is excusable neglect and
what is inexcusable neglect can hardly be determined in a vacuum." Id. at 245.
Instead, the possibility of a meritorious defense to the suit must also be considered
for it "is always an important factor in the consideration of a motion to set aside a
default judgment." Id. at 244-45. For some courts, the presence of a meritorious
defense is more significant when the movant is seeking to set aside a default under
rule 55(c). In Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739 (W.D. Va. 1977), the court
noted that, "[w]hen the issue is one of whether to set aside an entry of default ... it
is not absolutely necessary that the neglect ... be excusable .... Courts have been
more willing to grant relief to a defaulting party when that party has acted with
reasonable promptness [and] has provided underlying facts in support of a claim of a
meritorious defense." Id. at 742 (citations omitted); accord, Mitchell v. Eaves, 24
F.R.D. 434, 435 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
222. 533 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1976).
223. Id. at 893.
224. In McCloskey & Co. v. Eckart, 164 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1947) (default), the
appellate court agreed with the lower court's statement that the first issue to be
resolved in considering the set aside motion is whether a defense is present. Id. at
258. If it is, "'the Court may permit [the judgment] to be opened; but if not, It
would be an idle gesture."' Id. In Comes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir.
1970), the court, though noting the judicial preference for a trial on the merits,
stated that competing considerations require the defaulting party to show "that he
has a meritorious defense to the action." Id. at 1366 (footnote omitted).
225. United States v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433, 434
(D.S.C. 1967).
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Thus, even if the delay were deemed excusable, the default judgment
would not be set aside absent a showing of a defense to the suit.2:
2. What Constitutes a Meritorious Defense
Courts have varied greatly in setting standards for establishing the
existence of a meritorious defense. The burden of proof a court im-
poses on the movant may be an indication of whether the court is
more concerned with judicial economy or with giving the movant an
opportunity to present his evidence at a formal trialYZ In the major-
ity of cases, the movant outlines the facts of his intended defense.2 '
Those courts adopting a liberal approach to the meritorious defense
226. In Williams v. Ward, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944
(1977), the appellate court accepted the lower court's holding that a motion to set
aside a default could be denied due to a lack of a meritorious defense. Id. at 1149.
Nevertheless, the court reversed because the movant had a complete defense. Id. at
1150-62. In Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supplies Co.,
268 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (default), the court stated that "[e]ven if we were
inclined under Rule 60(b) to relieve the defendant from [the] default because
of ... excusable neglect, the defendant has failed to submit a sufficient affidavit of
merits." Id. at 1011. Some courts have conspicuously noted the failure of the movant
to at least allege a meritorious defense. In Moldwood Corp. v. Stutts, 410 F.2d 351
(5th Cir. 1969), the court stated that it "would be quickly persuaded to give [the
movant] relief if ... he had given the District Court even a hint of a suggestion that
he had a meritorious defense." Id. at 352; accord, Ralston Purina Co. v. Navieras de
Canarias, S.A., 619 F.2d 152, 153 (1st Cir. 1980); American & Foreign Ins. Ass'n v.
Commercial Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1978); Trachtman v. T.M.S. Realty
and Financial Servs., 393 F. Supp. 1342, 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (default); Associated
Press v. J.B. Broadcasting, Ltd., 54 F.R.D. 563, 564 (D. Md. 1972). Wagg v. Hall,
42 F.R.D. 589, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v. Fang, 182 F. Supp. 446, 454
(N.D. Cal. 1959) (default), aff'd, 300 F.2d 400 (9th Cir.i, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 935
(1962). But see note 230 infra and accompanying text.
227. Few courts have articulated the purpose for the meritorious defense require-
ment. In only four cases have the courts clearly implied that the meritorious defense
factor should be used to increase the movant's chances of obtaining relief from the
default or default judgment so as to permit a trial on the merits. See Medunic v.
Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 893 (3d Cir. 1976); Schwab v. Bullock's Inc., 508 F.2d 353,
355 (9th Cir. 1974); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244-45
(3d Cir. 1951); Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977) (de-
fault). Alternatively, only four cases were found in which the courts have linked the
meritorious defense requirement and judicial economy. See Comes v. Williams, 420
F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); McCloskey & Co. v. Eckart, 164 F.2d 257, 258
(5th Cir. 1947) (default); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp.
495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (default); United States v. $3,216.59 in United States
Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433, 434 (D.S.C. 1967). Professor Moore has stated that the
requirement serves the interest of judicial economy and is a necessary countervailing
factor to the statutory requirements of rule 55(c) and rule 60(b). The rules, he
argues, "on their face seem designed" to accomplish the goal "of a just resolution of
the particular dispute" over that of "the need for prompt and efficient handling of
litigation." 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.10[4], at 55-251 to -252 (2d ed. 1976).
228. See notes 229, 248-50 infra.
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factor accept the movant's factual allegations as true, and, therefore,
find a meritorious defense.2 9  Other courts have been even more
liberal. The most striking example occurs when a court grants the set
aside motion with no discussion of the merits of the movant's
defense.m In other cases, a movant's unsubstantiated claim that he
has a meritorious defense to the action23' or his denial of the allega-
tions in the complaint22 has been held sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement.
229. Turner v. Salvatierra, 580 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Charl-
ton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, Inc., 556 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1977);
Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245, 252 n.8 (4th Cir.
1974); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Hutton v. Fisher,
359 F.2d 913, 915 (3d Cir. 1966); Provident Security Life Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, 323
F.2d 839, 840-43 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964); Rooks v. Amer-
ican Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Reynal v. United
States, 153 F.2d 929, 930 n.5 (5th Cir. 1945); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S.S.
Hellenic Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Altschul v. Paine Webber,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 859-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (default); Morris v. Charnin, 85
F.R.D. 689, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 714
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Caruso v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586, 588-89 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); Thorne v. Pennsylvania, 77 F.R.D. 396, 398-99 (E.D. Pa. 1977); New
York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Broglie v. Mackay-Smith, 75 F.R.D. 739, 742 (W.D. Va. 1977) (default); Hamilton v.
Edell, 67 F.R.D. 18, 20-21 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (default); Morisse v. Defensive Instru-
ments, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 433, 435 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door
Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3, 8 (D.S.C. 1970); SEC v. Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297, 300
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (default); Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1155-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(default); United States v. Small, 24 F.R.D. 429, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Minneapo-
lis Brewing Co. v. Merritt, 143 F. Supp. 146, 149 (D.N.D. 1956).
230. After granting the set aside motion, the court in United States v. $3,976.62
in Currency, 37 F.R.D. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), specifically stated that the merits of
the movant's defense to the suit "are of no present concern to this Court." Id. at
566; accord, Edwin Raphael Co. v. Maharam Fabrics Corp., 283 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.
1960); Gill v. Stolow, 2,40 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1957); Wilson v. Winstead, 84 F.R.D.
218 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (default); Kennerly v. Aro, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1083 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977) (default); Singer Co. v. Greever and Walsh Wholesale Textile, Inc., 82
F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (default); Johnson v. Harper, 66 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.
Tenn. 1975) (default); Boyer v. Wisconsin, 55 F.R.D. 90 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (default);
Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970); Bedard v. Consolidated Mut.
Ins. Co., 313 F. Supp. 1020 (D.P.R. 1970) (default); Gillespie v. Hysmith, 44 F.R.D.
476 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (default); United States v. 96 Cases, More or Less, of Fire-
works, 244 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Teal v. King Farms Co., 18 F.R.D. 447
(E.D. Pa. 1955) (default); Ellington v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953) (de-
fault); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 76 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979).
231. The court in Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1975) (default), stated that "[a]lthough [the defendant] has done nothing more than
allege a meritorious defense ... the Court does not think the ... allegations are so
insubstantial as to preclude . . . the setting aside of the default. Also, it is notewor-
thy that some courts do not require elaboration on the facts underlying a meritorious
defense; allegation of the defense will suffice." Id. at 234; accord, Jackson v. Beech,
636 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1980); A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distrib.
Co., 461 F.2d 40, 43 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 715
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Within this liberal framework, Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc. M
and Tolson v. Hodge2" represent the most innovative approaches to
deciding the quality of the evidence sufficient to establish a merito-
rious defense. In Trueblood, the court inferred the existence of a
meritorious defense from "the very nature of plaintiff's complaint
[that] gives rise to the belief that cases where persons slip on the
floor of a store are customarily defended with varying degrees of
merit."' z In Tolson, a case in which the plaintiff defaulted by failing
to file a timely answer to a counterclaim, 6 the court inferred a
meritorious defense from an earlier pleading. ' The court noted that
the "plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the sole proximate
cause . . . was defendant's decedent's negligence. If established at
trial this would constitute a complete defense . . . Thus, one of
plaintiff's intended defenses to the counterclaim had already been
pleaded." 
The justification for liberal treatment of the requirement is that
default judgments are not favored in the law because they deprive a
party of a trial on the merits.z2 Consequently, the grounds for set-
ting it aside are to be liberally construed -0 with any doubt resolved
in favor of the movant.2" Bias in favor of the movant while consider-
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Wagg v. Hall, 42 F.R.D. 589, 591 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Kulakowich v.
A/S Borgestad, 36 F.R.D. 185, 186 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (default); A.C. Samford, Inc. v.
United States, 226 F. Supp. 72, 76 (M.D. Ga. 1963) (default); Dalminter, Inc. v.
Jessie Edwards, Inc., 27 F.R.D. 491, 492 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Alopari v. O'Leary, 154
F. Supp. 78, 81 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (default); Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 4 F.R.D. 496, 497 (S.D.W. Va. 1945); Standard Grate Bar Co. v. De-
fense Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 372 (M.D. Pa. 1944); United States ex rel. Kantor
Bros. v. Mutual Constr. Corp., 3 F.R.D. 227, 228 (E.D. Pa. 1943). Ten of the 29
judges who clearly responded to the question, "[i]n establishing [the existence of a
meritorious] defense, must specific facts be shown or is [a] mere alle-
gation... sufficient" indicated that, in most situations, the mere allegation that such
a defense exists would be sufficient. See note 8 supra.
232. In Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb. 1948), the court stated that
"[t]he proposed answer admits only the defendant's name, residence, and ownership
of the designated real property. All other allegations of the complaint ... are de-
nied. Such a pleading... states a defense to the plaintiff's claim." Id. at 86; accord,
Patapoff v. Vollstedt's Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1959); Tozer v. Charles A.
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1951).
233. 32 F.R.D. 190 (E.D. Va. 1963).
234. 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969).
235. 32 F.R.D. at 196.
236. 411 F.2d at 125.
237. Id. at 130. In Elias v. Pitucci, 13 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (default), the
movant's defense was inferred by the court from the pleadings of the adversary. Id.
at 14.
238. 411 F.2d at 130.
239. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
240. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
241. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the proferred defense, however, is significantly different from an
uncritical acceptance or assumption that such a defense exists. The
competing concern for judicial economy also deserves consid-
eration.- If the defaulting party has no defense to the suit, setting
aside a default judgment for the academic exercise of litigating the
merits is not only futile, but also wasteful." '
Perhaps recognizing this problem, other courts have modified or
rejected the standards adopted by the more liberal courts and estab-
lished more rigorous standards of proof for showing the existence
of a meritorious defense44 Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v.
Zimmermanr specifically established a nexus between rigorous stan-
dards of proof and judicial economy.246 The court stated that
"[c]ontrary authority indicating that the party in default need only
242. Some courts have stressed the importance of judicial economy. In Cliff v.
PPX Publishing Co., 84 F.R.D. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court refused to set aside
the default judgment of approximately $93,000. As one of the reasons for its holding,
the court noted the "pressing need to keep current with our trial calendar in this
congested court." Id. at 371; accord, Dolphin Plumbing Co. v. Financial Corp. of N.
Am., 508 F.2d 1326, 1327 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Comes v. Williams, 420 F.2d
1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Bell Tel. Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D.
16, 22 (D. Del. 1976); Aberson v. Glassman, 70 F.R.D. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(default); Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 453 (M.D. Pa. 1976),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977).
243. See notes 224-25 supra and accompanying text.
244. Olson v. Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1319-22 (10th Cir. 1978); FTC v. Packers
Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Comes v. Wil-
hams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4, 6 (9th
Cir. 1969) (default); Consolidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr.
Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1967); McCloskey & Co. v. Eckart, 164 F.2d 257,
258-60 (5th Cir. 1947) (default); Jackson v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1940);
Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 87 F.R.D.
152, 155-56 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F.
Supp. 495, 497 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (default); Reid v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co.,
484 F. Supp. 435, 439-42 (E.D. Pa. 1980); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic
Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 69-70 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Bell Tel. Labs., Inc. v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16, 21-22 (D. Del. 1976); Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW,
71 F.R.D. 449, 453 (M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. Kostenbauder v.
Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 951 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (default); Ameday v. United States
Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Design & Dcv., Inc. v. Vibromatic
Mfg., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 71, 77 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Residential Reroofing Union Local
30-B v. Mezicco, 55 F.R.D. 516, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Robinson v. Bantam Books,
Inc., 49 F.R.D. 139, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (default); Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v.
International Maritime Supplies Co., 268 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (de-
fault); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nichol-
son v. Allied Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 206, 206-07 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Federal
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frank Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 109, 112 (W.D. Mo.
1954); Bowles v. Branick, 66 F. Supp. 557, 558 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
245. 485 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (default).
246. Id. at 497.
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allege a meritorious defense .. .must be disregarded .... Such a
rule would over emphasize the policy of disposing of cases on the
merits at the expense of the counterbalancing considerations of judi-
cial economy and efficiency." 217 Other courts, while accepting the
movant's factual allegations as true, have served the interests of judi-
cial economy by determining that the allegation did not constitute a
legally sufficient defense.24n
Additionally, some courts have held that a general denial l or a
conclusory allegation that a defense to the action exists' is insuffi-
cient to show the existence of a meritorious defense. In Olson v.
Stone," the court acknowledged that the movant's version of the facts
should be accepted as true.5 2 The court also stated, however, that a
general denial was insufficient to constitute a showing of a merito-
rious defense.- The movant's attorney objected to the application of
this rule, arguing that because the case rested on whether the allega-
tions of the complaint were true, "'a defendant's denial of those fac-
tual assertions ...would be an adequate defense at the time of
trial."''' The Stone court, however, held that "no meritorious de-
fense showing was made"'' because the movant failed to present "a
sufficient elaboration of facts to permit the trial court to judge
whether the defense, if movant's version were believed, would be
247. Id. (citations omitted).
248. In Olson v. Stone, 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978). the court specifically
stated that, in reviewing the movant's factual allegations, "the focus will be on the
legal sufficiency of the allegations... rather than their truth." Id. at 1320; e.g..
Pennsylvania Nat l Bank & Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 87 F.R.D.
152, 155-56 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (proferred defense would be barred by the state's "Dead
Man's Statute); Williams v. Ward, 416 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (default)
(proferred defense violates due process), rev'd, 556 F.2d 1143, 1150 (2d Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Design & Dev., Inc. v. Vibromatic Mfg., Inc., 58
F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (proferred defense would be barred under controlling
state law governing suits brought on a written contract).
249. Olson v. Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978); Madsen v. Bumb, 419
F.2d 4, 6 (9th Cir. 1969) (default).
250. FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); Comes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970); Consolidated
Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp.. 383 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.
1967); United States v. Topeka Livestock Auction, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 944, 951 (N.D.
Ind. 1975) (default); Robinson v. Bantam Books, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 139, 140 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (default); Federal Enterprises, Inc. v. Frank Allbritten Motors, Inc., 16 F.R.D.
109, 112 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Bowles v. Branick, 66 F. Supp. 557, 558 (W.D. Mo.
1946). Nineteen of the 29 judges who clearly responded to the question, "[in estab-
lishing [the existence of a meritorious] defense, must specific facts be shown or is [a]
mere allegation ... sufficient" indicated that they would require the movant to show
specific facts. See note 8 supra.
251. 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978).
252. Id. at 1320.
253. Id. at 1319.
254. Id. at 1320.
255. Id. at 1322.
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meritorious." ' Normally, a simple denial of "the averments upon
which the adverse party relies" 157 leads to a trial 2 during which tile
defendant is given the opportunity to prove the truth of his position
and thus avoid liability. It would follow that if the movant's assertions
are deemed to be true, a general denial would constitute a sufficient
showing of a meritorious defense.21'
Although many courts assume the truth of the movant's version of
the facts,"o other courts that use the meritorious defense requirement
to serve the interests of judicial economy "I require some type of sub-
stantiation of the alleged defense"2& Some courts have gone so far as
256. Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted).
257. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
258. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) outlines the form that an acceptable defense must take.
The relevant part provides that "the pleader... may make his denials as specific
denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he may generally deny all the
averments except such designated averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits."
Id.
259. See cases cited note 232 supra.
260. See note 229 supra.
261. As noted, few courts have articulated the purpose of the meritorious defense
requirement. See note 227 supra and accompanying text. Instructively, of the courts
that have been more rigorous in reviewing the proof of the movant's proferred de-
fense, see note 244 supra, only five held that the movant met the burden of proof.
Ameday v. United States Trucking Co., 62 F.R.D. 72, 74 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (defense
supported by independent and police reports); Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43
F.R.D. 413, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (defense supported by affidavits and attached
medical records); Nicholson v. Allied Chem. Corp., 200 F. Supp. 206, 206-07 (E.D.
Pa. 1961) (defense supported by witnesses). In General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olym-
pic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1979), the court did not outline the
evidence the movant offered in support of the defense. The court held, however,
that the defense was sufficient despite the plaintiff's "commendably thorough"
attempt to rebut. Id. at 69. In McCloskey & Co. v. Eckart, 164 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1947), the appellate court carefully examined the defenses offered by the movant
because the lower court had held that the defenses were legally insufficient. The
court disagreed and reversed. Id. at 258-60.
262. In Olson v. Stone, 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978), the court merely noted
that "a sufficient elaboration of facts" is required. Id. at 1319. It stated that the
additional facts "may be satisfactorily presented in the written motion itself, in an
appended proposed answer, or in attached affidavits." Id. at 1319-20. In Central
Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of Am., 491 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1974), the court
stated that the movant's burden of showing a meritorious defense is met when he
produces uncontradicted testimony which, if believed, would constitute a defense to
the action. Id. at 252 n.8. By allowing the opposing party to contradict the movant's
allegations, the court underscores its rejection of the principle that those allegations
be accepted as true. In Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1969) (default), the
court pointed out that, although the movant's brief mentioned "various favorable
evidence," he failed to provide "supporting affidavits or documents," nor did he
"specify his potential witnesses." Id. at 6. In Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332 (8th
Cir. 1947), the court stated that the movant's allegations must be "properly verified."
Id. at 336. This verification requirement underscores the court's implicit rejection of
the notion that the movant's allegations be accepted as true. In Tri-Continental Leas-
ing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (default), the court
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to pass on the merits of the movant's claims. :  Despite the concern
for judicial economy, the hearing on the set aside motion should
not be a substitute for trial. A court is well-advised to require some
evidence of the viability of the movant's defense so as not to waste
time on a full trial. The movant, however, should be given the oppor-
tunity to prove his alleged defenses at trial rather than at the hearing.
B. Prejudice
1. Instances of Prejudice and Mitigation
In addition to requiring that the movant show both an excuse for
his delay and a meritorious defense, some courts have -also considered
whether setting aside the judgment will result in substantial prej-
udice to the non-defaulting party,' or in some instances, to a third
party. For example, substantial prejudice has been found when a
stated that the movant need not prove the existence of a meritorious defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Rather, he "only carries the burden of producing
competent evidence that establishes a factual or legal basis for the tendered de-
fense." Id. at 497. In Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449 (M.D. Pa.
1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
1977), six plaintiffs sued the Secretary of Health Education and Welfare for benefits
allegedly due under federal law. The defendant's motion for a summary judgment
was taken by default because the plaintiffs failed to respond. The court, although
confronted with the complaint, held that the movants had "a duty to make some
demonstration that their position on the merits is likely to succeed." Id. at 453. The
court did not discuss the type of evidentiary substantiation it required. Nevertheless,
it apparently refused to accept the truth of the allegations contained in the com-
plaint. In Atlantic Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supplies Co., 268
F. Supp. 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (default), the court held that the movant's claim that
his adversary breached three covenants was not sufficient to establish a meritorious
defense as it was not "otherwise explained." Id. at 1011.
263. E.g., Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 497-
99 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (default); Reid v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp.
435, 439-40 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Kostenbauder v. Secretary, HEW, 71 F.R.D. 449, 453
(M.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd mem. sub nom. Kostenbauder v. Weinberger, 556 F.2d 565
(3d Cir. 1977); Usery v. Weiner Bros., 70 F.R.D. 615, 617 (D. Conn. 1976); Wil-
liams v. Ward, 416 F. Supp. 1123, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (default), rev'd on other
grounds, 556 F.2d 1143 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 944 (1977); Atlantic
Steamers Supply Co. v. International Maritime Supplies Co., 268 F. Supp. 1009,
1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (default). For a discussion of Williams, see note 225 supra.
264. See pt. I(B) supra.
265. E.g., Reid v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435, 43S (E.D.
Pa. 1980); Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Wagg v. Hall, 42 F.R.D. 589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1967). The lack of prejudice require-
ment has also been referred to as lack of intervening equities or lack of harm to the
plaintiff. E.g., Mannke v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 375 F.2d 281, 285 (3d Cir. 1967)
(default); General Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. Answering Serv., 277 F.2d 919, 921
(5th Cir. 1960); Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
266. E.g., Ben Sager Chems. Int'l, Inc. v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 808
(7th Cir. 1977) (motion for relief denied as court found that plaintiff and one of
movant's co-defendants were justified in relying on default judgment in making a
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Federal Trade Commission investigation had been frustrated,""l when
the delay had led to loss of evidence,20 when discovery had been
stalled,29 when the non-moving party had suffered undue loss of time
and expense,2"0 when the non-movant would have been forced to con-
tinue prosecuting against a meritless defense,2 1 and when further de-
lay would have thwarted the non-movant's ultimate recovery,2 2
Some courts have considered the potential prejudice to the movant
resulting from denial of the motion when the amount in controversy
is substantial. In Henry v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 24 the
district court held that "[m]atters involving such sums should not be
settlement and would be prejudiced if damage issue were to be relitigated); New
York State Health Facilities Ass'n v. Carey, 76 F.R.D. 128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(motion granted because New York State taxpayers, real parties in interest, ought not
be punished for their attorney's neglect).
267. FTC v. Packers Brand Meats, Inc., 562 F.2d 9, 10 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) (mo-
tion for relief denied because movant refused to testify or produce documents at
hearing in violation of subpeona and later refused to obey court order directing
movant to show cause why subpoena should not be granted).
268. United States v. Martin, 395 F. Supp. 954, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (motion for
relief denied when government claimed it would be prejudiced if it had to recon-
struct evidence upon which it had based tax assessments at issue when movant
waited three years before bringing rule 60(b) motion).
269. Titus v. Smith, 51 F.R.D. 224 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (default). In finding that the
plaintiff would be prejudiced by stalled discovery if the motion were granted, the
Titus court noted that "[a]s time passes, memories fade and documents are lost or
destroyed. As the accessibility to the truth through discovery decreases, the oppor-
tunity for fraud and collusion increases." Id. at 227.
270. Wilcox v. Triple D Corp., 78 F.R.D. 5, 7 (E.D. Va. 1978) (default) ("ob-
vious" prejudice when non-moving party frustrated purposes of rules at every pro-
cedural step resulting in unduly protracted proceedings); Hartford Accident and In-
dem. Co. v. Smeck, 78 F.R.D. 537, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prejudice found when
intervenor failed to intervene until default judgment was procured causing further
protraction of proceedings); H & F Barge Co. v. Garber Bros., 71 F.R.D. 5, 10
(E.D. La. 1974) (prejudice found in subjecting financially insecure corporation to
substantial litigation expense), aff'd per curiam, 534 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1976).
271. Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., 87
F.R.D. 152, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1980). This court, in finding the lack of a meritorious
defense prejudicial, seems to have combined the two judicially established require-
ments.
272. Hughes v. Holland, 320 F.2d 781, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (motion denied when
further delay would have resulted in foreclosure on disputed real estate).
273. E.g., Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1966); Rooks v. American
Brass Co., 263 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam); Bridoux v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Tozer
v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951); Kinnear Corp.
v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3, 8 (D.S.C. 1970); Horn v. Intelectron
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc.,
32 F.R.D. 190, 196 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1963); Wolfsohn v Raab, 11 F.R.D. 254, 255
(E.D. Pa. 1951); Henry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 3 F.R.D. 142, 144 (W.D. Va.
1942) (default).
274. 3 F.R.D. 142 (W.D. Va. 1942) (default).
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determined by default judgments if it can reasonably be avoided." Z
Although Henry involved a court's refusal to enter a default
judgment, 76 the Third and Sixth Circuits have applied the Henry
rationale to determine whether a judgment should be set aside.
Notions of what constitutes a substantial amount in controversy have
changed since the Henry decision in 1942. As recently as 1970,
however, $14,000 was considered a large enough sum to invoke the
preference for a trial on the merits. -  Nevertheless, the existence of
a significant amount in controversy is not itself dispositive of the issue
whether to set aside a default judgment. Countervailing considera-
tions, such as "a strong showing of willful disobedience of court
process"- or failure to show a meritorious defense or excuse for the
delay,- may override the courts' reluctance to use default judgments
to decide cases involving large sums of money.
Cases in which courts have denied set aside motions because of
prejudice are rare,"' however, because mere delay in the final dis-
position of a case does not generally constitute prejudice sufficiently
substantial to warrant a denial. 2  Moreover, courts frequently im-
275. Id. at 144.
276. Id.
277. E.g., Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913, 916-17 (3d Cir. 1966) (vacating
$195,000 judgment, but as to liability only); Rooks v. American Brass Co., 263 F.2d
166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (vacating $60,000 default judgment); Tozer v.
Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1951) (setting aside de-
fault judgment conditionally). A few district courts have also applied the Henry
rationale. Horn v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (set-
ting aside default judgment); Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 196
n.3 (E.D. Va. 1963) (setting aside $125,000 default judgment conditionally). Other
courts, while not adopting the express language of the Henryj decision, have followed
its reasoning. See Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.)
(failure to grant relief from "large money judgment" deemed "improvident" and
$160,000 default judgment set aside conditionally), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954);
Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3. 8 (D.S.C. 1970) ($14,000
default judgment set aside when defendant stood "to lose a great deal"); Wolfsohn v.
Raab, 11 F.R.D. 254, 255 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (default judgment set aside when
plaintiff's claim was "substantial").
278. Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49 F.R.D. 3. 8 (D.S.C. 1970).
279. Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 1964)
(affirming trial court's denial of motion to set aside $1,000.000 default judgment),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 956 (1965).
280. Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1970) (affirming trial
court's denial of motion to set aside $153,788.46 default judgment).
281. The ten cases cited in notes 269-75 supra were the only cases found in which
courts found prejudice sufficiently substantial to warrant the denial of a set aside
motion.
282. E.g., Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951)
(delay in realizing satisfaction of claim not sufficiently prejudicial to deny set aside
motion); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66, 70
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (slight delay in satisfaction of claim not prejudicial). Caruso v. Drake
Motor Lines, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 586, 589 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (some delay in finally resolv-
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pose conditions to their orders to set aside default judgments to miti-
gate prejudice to the non-moving party.3 These conditions may in-
clude the imposition on the movant of court costs and/or attorney's
fees occasioned by the delay.- In addition, courts often require the
prompt filing of an answer to avoid further delay.2 In some cases,
ing claim is always involved in setting aside a default judgment but is not of itself
prejudicial); Thorne v. Pennsylvania, 77 F.R.D. 396, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (same).
283. Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan and Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir.
1974). Courts justify the imposition of conditions by noting that rule 60(b) authorizes
relief "upon such terms as are just." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); e.g., Thorpe v. Thorpe,
364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C.
Cir. 1954); Morisse v. Defensive Instruments, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 433, 435 (E.D. Wis.
1972). In response to the question, "Considering the aspect of punishment that en-
ters into any refusal to set aside a default judgment when a meritorious defense is
present, would you prefer to assess court costs, attorney's fees, or other fines rather
than upholding the default judgment," 13 judges indicated that they would prefer to
impose these lesser sanctions. Three others agreed that this approach is preferable
when a meritorious defense has been presented. Only three judges argued that such
sanctions are inappropriate. Thirteen judges indicated that there is no simple answer
to this question because each case involves different facts. See note 8 supra.
284. E.g., Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (all costs of the
appeal of the set aside motion); Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481,
484 (9th Cir. 1937) (prejudice caused by a few days delay in answering capable of
mitigation by the imposition of costs); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S.S. Hellenic
Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ($750 to plaintiff's counsel within ten
days); Wilcox v. Triple D Corp., 78 F.R.D. 5, 8 (E.D. Va. 1978) (default) (defendant
required to reimburse plaintiff for all "costs and expenses reasonably incurred by
plaintiff. . . to obtain and retain its default"); Morisse v. Defensive Instruments,
Inc., 55 F.R.D. 433, 435 (E.D. Wis. 1972) ($400 payable to plaintiff or its counsel);
Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 190, 195 (E.D. Va. 1963) (plaintiff's
counsel to be paid the taxable costs of the action, copying costs, phone bills, and
$2,000 to cover attorney's fees and other money owed by the defendant); Hendricks
v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 32 F.R.D. 169, 173 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ($850 to cover attorney's fees
and costs); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 76, 85 (Bankr. D. Or.
1979) ($2500 bond to cover costs and attorney's fees). Court costs and attorney's fees
are the most commonly imposed conditions. Wokan v. Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d
1232, 1234 (3d Cir. 1973); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966);
Williams v. Cal Indus.. Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep. (West) 76, 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979). Rule
55(b)(1) directs the clerk to include court costs when he enters judgment against a
defaulting party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a) (1976)
provides for assessment of $20 for attorney's and proctor's docket fees in cases in
which a default judgment is entered by either the clerk or the court.
285. E.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. S.S. Hellenic Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 138
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (20 days to answer); Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 76, 85 (Bankr. 1). Or. 1979) (same). To avoid further delay or prejudice to the
non-moving party, conditions or sanctions other than the prompt filing of an answer
have also been imposed. Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1957) (appear at
deposition within a month); Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210
(D.C. Cir.) (counterclaim dismissed), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Altschul v.
Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (default) (fulfillment of
all further obligations on a timely basis); Wilcox v. Triple D Corp., 78 F.R.D. 5, 8
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movants have been required to post bond for the amount sought by
the other party.2
2. How Prejudice is Established
Most of the courts that consider possible prejudice to the non-
moving party do not place the burden of establishing such prejudice
or the lack thereof on either party.2 Rather, after reviewing the
facts, the courts appear to determine sua sponte whether there is
prejudice sufficiently substantial to influence their decisions.' A few
courts, however, place the burden of showing lack of prejudice on
the movant.219 The apparent justification is that the movant must
persuade the court of the merits of his motion because he requested
that the default judgment be set aside. The judicially established re-
quirements thereby serve the goal of judicial economy because the
motion to set aside a default judgment will fail unless the movant
establishes the presence of a meritorious defense and lack of pre-
judice to the opposing party. Professor Moore views the judicially
established requirements as necessary to counterbalance the inherent
liberality of the rules.90 He suggests that because the rules them-
(E.D. Va. 1978) (default) (defendant required to pay for future expenses of plaintiff in
defending its right to its default); Hendricks v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 32 F.R.D. 169, 173
(E.D. Pa. 1963) (answer interrogatories, produce documents, and pay $100 if case is
not over by a certain date); Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp. 538, 540 (S.D.N.Y.
1957) (be deposed within 20 days).
286. Wokan v. Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1235 (3d Cir. 1973) (for unsatis-
fied portion of the judgment); Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d 692, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(for maximum amount demanded by appellee in complaint); Insurance Co. of N. Am.
v. S.S. Hellenic Patriot, 87 F.R.D. 136, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (for any judgment the
plaintiff might obtain). Although the imposition of reasonable conditions is allowed,
Thorpe v. Thorpe, 364 F.2d at 694; Williams v. Cal Indus., Int'l, 2 Bankr. Rep.
(West) 76, 85 (Bankr. D. Or. 1979), in Wokan and Thorpe, the appellate courts
voiced concern about the due process implications of such strict conditions and re-
manded the cases to the district courts on this issue. 485 F.2d at 1235; 364 F.2d at
695; accord, Littlefield v. Walt Flanagan and Co., 498 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th Cir.
1974) (remanded to the district court to consider the propriety of $300 sanction). But
cf. Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (plaintiff could make no
claim of prejudice as movant offered to post security for amount of judgment).
287. E.g., Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969); Bridoux v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 209, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821
(1954); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1951);
Gardner v. Johnson, 429 F. Supp. 432, 434 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (default); Bell Tel.
Labs., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 73 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D. Del. 1976); Schartner v.
Copeland, 59 F.R.D. 653, 656 (M.D. Pa.) (default), aff'd mein., 487 F.2d 1395 (3d
Cir. 1973); SEC v. Vogel, 49 F.R.D. 297, 299, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Horn v. Intelec-
tron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (default).
288. See cases cited note 287 supra.
289. E.g., United States v. Berger, 86 F.R.D. 713, 715 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Reid v.
Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 484 F. Supp. 435, 438 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
290. 6 J. Moore, Federal Practice 55.1014], at 55-252 (2d ed. 1976).
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selves are designed to favor trials on the merits at the expense of
judicial economy, the judicially established requirements should act
as restricting rather than as liberating factors.-"
In contrast, a few courts have implicitly placed the burden of show-
ing prejudice on the non-moving party."' 2 The Third Circuit has
further suggested that if the non-movant cannot establish how he
would be prejudiced by the setting aside of the default judgment, the
court should grant the motion.2 Under this approach, lack of prej-
udice acts not as a "necessary counterbalancing factor" but as addi-
tional support for granting the set aside motion. Consequently, these
courts have apparently concluded that the already liberal rules should
be liberally construed whenever possible.2'
PROPOSAL
In deciding whether to set aside a default judgment, courts con-
sider a variety of factors in attempting to resolve the tension between
judicial economy and the desire for a trial on the merits. The broad
discretion involved in this decision, however, renders it difficult to
predict with any degree of certainty how a court will weigh these
factors in arriving at its decision. Consequently, the implementation
of certain suggestions may provide a more equitable resolution of the
tension in the rules and greater consistency and predictability in the
disposition of set aside motions.
Because of the drastic nature of the default judgment sanction, the
court should ensure that efforts be made to notify the defaulting party
of the possible entry of judgment against him. For example, the court
might issue an order to show cause why the default judgment should
not be granted. Such an order would avoid the problems in deter-
mining whether a movant has appeared and is entitled to notice.
Once a default judgment is entered, however, a set aside motion
should be disposed of by considering the merits of the defense and
the excuse for the delay in tandem. Disposing of a set aside motion
on the grounds of the excusability of the delay without sufficient con-
291. See id.
292. E.g., General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Olympic Gardens, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 66,
70 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Schartner v. Copeland, 59 F.R.D. 653, 656 (M.D. Pa.) (default),
aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973); Finch v. Big Chief Drilling Co., 56
F.R.D. 456, 458 (E.D. Tex. 1972); Kulakowich v. A/S Borgestad, 36 F.R.D. 185, 186
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (default).
293. E.g., Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 893-94 (3d Cir. 1976); Diversified
Utilities Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661, 665
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Stuski v. United States Lines, 31 F.R.D. 188, 191 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(default); Teal v. King Farms Co., 18 F.R.D. 447, 447-48 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (default);
accord, Bavouset v. Shaw's of San Francisco, 43 F.R D. 296, 298 (S.D. Tex. 1967)
(default).
294. See cases cited note 293 supra.
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sideration of the merits of the movant's defense offends both the goal
of judicial economy and the desire for a trial on the merits. Granting
a motion without sufficient consideration of the merits of the defense
may unnecessarily burden the court if it is later shown that the
movant has no defense. Denying a motion without considering the
movant's defense may deprive a movant who has a viable defense of
his day in court. Yet, overemphasis on the meritorious defense factor
may result in unfairness if a wilfully defaulting party is able to bypass
the requirements of the rules entirely. By considering the merits of
the defense and the excuse for the delay in tandem, a movant with-
out a defense will not burden the court, and a movant with a strong
defense will be more likely to succeed as the court may be more
inclined to excuse the delay.
When reviewing the movant's alleged defense, the judge should
require more than a mere allegation that such a defense exists be-
cause an overly liberal standard provides insufficient insight into the
likelihood of the eventual success of the defense. A judge should not,
however, resolve the merits of the defense at the motion hearing,
thus denying the movant the benefit of a formal trial. Instead, the
judge should require substantiation of the alleged defense sufficient
to indicate a reasonable likelihood of success, resolving -all doubts in
favor of the movant.
Finally, although courts should be predisposed toward trials on the
merits, they should use their power to mitigate any harm to the non-
defaulting party or the court. Consistently imposing conditions to
granting set aside motions, such as court costs and/or attorney's fees,
would further the goal of judicial economy by deterring parties from
defaulting and preventing parties from filing set aside motions when
they lack a defense to the suit.
Peter H. Bresnan
James P. Cornelio
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